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TAYYAB MAHMUD*

Migration, Identity, & the Colonial
Encounter
The postcolonialexist as an aftermath, as an after - after being
worked over by colonialism.1
Movement between cultures, languages, and complex configurations of meaning and power have always been the territory of
the colonized.2
[S]ense of words like "nation", "people", "sovereignty"
"community"... are leaking out of so many cracked vessels. '

A

specter is haunting the "new world order:" the specter of
the immigrant. To live with this specter is to live with
desires and anxieties of the state and the nation. It is also to live
with the heritage and genealogies of empire and imperialism.
The public debate about, and legislative responses to, this specter
remain preoccupied with characterizing the immigrant as an outsider and a threat, with immigration configured as a problem to
be solved, a flaw to be corrected, a war to be fought, and a flow
to be stopped.4 This posture rests on some implicit assumptions
of fixed identities, unproblematic nationhood, indivisible sovereignty, ethnic homogeneity, and exclusive citizenship. These assumptions posit a picture of the inter/national system that
consists of complete, differentiated, and closed living spaces, con* Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland State University. B.A., 1973, University
of Punjab; M.Sc., 1975, University of Islamabad; Ph.D., 1981, University of Hawaii;
J.D., 1987, University of California, Hastings College of Law. The research for this
Article was supported by a grant from the Cleveland-Marshall Fund. I would like to
thank Keith Aoki, Nathaniel Berman, Rosemary J. Coombe, Patricia J. Falk, Kunal
M. Parker, and Mustapha K. Pasha for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts.
1 Gyan Prakash, Postcolonial Criticism and Indian Historiography, 31 SOCIAL
TEXT 8 (1992) (internal citation omitted).
2 Chandra Mohanty, Feminist Encounters: Locating the Politics of Experience, 1
COPYRIGHT 42 (Fall 1987) (emphasis omitted).
3 ON JEAN-Luc NANCY: THE SENSE OF PHILOSOPHY 13 (Darren Sheppard et al.
eds., 1997) (quoting Jean-Luc Nancy) (internal citation omitted).
4 See generally IMMIGRANTS OUT! THE NEW NAIVISM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES (Juan

[6331

F.

Perea ed.,

1997).
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stituted by the pivotal organizing principle of sovereign nationstates. The immigrant does not fit this picture well. She remains
an outsider, an alien body, to be normalized, homogenized, and
assimilated. As a non-citizen, she is to be marginalized in distribution of legal rights and political protections. As a cultural signifier, she is to be erased. As a violator of borders, she provides
the rationale to ever strengthen the territorial divides. The
threat perception triggered by the immigrant traverses two fields:
that of the state, and that of the nation. The immigrant puts at
issue the inviolability of borders, territoriality of sovereignty,
particularity of jurisdiction, and uniformity of citizenship-fundamental characteristics of the modern state. The immigrant
calls into question cultural homogeneity, linguistic commonality,
shared history, a sense of belonging, and security of identity-the
key ideologies of the nation.
These assumptions and postures warrant a reexamination of
some fundamental questions that surround the phenomenon of
migration. Are the causes, sources, and processes of migration
uniform and predictable? Is the migrant available for sovereignty's demand for complete allegiance? Can the migrant partake of the pre-existing imagined community, the nation? Is the
migrant compatible with the institutional designs of the state? Is
migrant identity commensurable with requisites of citizenship?
This Article explores these questions by locating them in spatial
and temporal sites removed from the common foci of the immigration debate. It argues that the relationships of empire and
imperialism between "the West and the Rest" 5 are central to the
inter/national imagining and construction of the immigrant; that
progressive incorporation of different parts of the world into a
unified system of accumulation and the resulting global division
of labor is the primary context within which the interface of the
migrant and the inter/national system unfolds. The relationship
of empire and imperialism with migration, however, is not a
mechanical or deterministic one. The terrains of empire and imperialism are contested sites, where contradictions between imperatives of exchange and sovereignty, and conflicts between
domination and resistance, are played out. Using stories from
colonial and postcolonial South Asia I argue that within the general contexts of empire and imperialism, the determinants and
5See Stuart Hall, The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power, in MODERNITY:
AN INTRODUCTION TO MODERN SOCIETIES 184, 185 (Stuart Hall et al. eds., 1996).
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processes of migration in the modern world system are multiple,
as borders are porous, identities flexible, and sovereignties malleable. Additionally, I argue that the compatibility of migration
with sovereignty, nation, and state is always partial, contingent,
and unstable.
The first part of this Article narrates three stories of migration
that unfolded in the context of India's encounter with British
colonialism. While these were not the only migrations triggered
by colonialism both within and from India, these particular stories highlight this article's central thesis that inter/national imaginations of the immigrant must take account of the relationships
of empire and imperialism, and that within the context of these
relationships, the causes, processes, and results of migration, and
the accompanying constructions and deployments of identities,
are diverse. This examination of the colonial encounter aims not
simply to document its record of exploitation and domination,
but also to track its failures and silences, in order to focus on
displacements and identities produced by its functioning. Implicated in this study are not only the successfully implemented designs of colonialism, but also its accommodations, ambivalences,
and breakdowns. Center stage here are not only the strategies of
colonial power but also native designs of resistance. Of the three
migrations examined, one was the product of colonial design, one
of anti-colonial resistance, and one occasioned by the collapse of
colonial rule. These three narratives locate determinants of migration and constructions of migrant identities at the intersection
of the demands of global systems of production and imperatives
of the principles of sovereignty and nation-state, and suggest that
migrant identities are forged through both operations of power
and strategies of resistance.
The second part of the Article addresses the issue of construction and deployment of post-migration identities. This part narrates a brief story of post-migration existence of a particular
South Asian community in order to draw conclusions about the
relationships of immigrants with the nation, the state, and citizenship. I argue that these relationships are contingent and unstable
because the construction and political deployment of the immigrant's identity is subject to the shifting alignments of political
forces in any particular setting. Whether the immigrant is privileged or marginalized in the national imagination may not be the
consequence of migration, but rather of specific political con-
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junctures that determine the extent to which the nation may be
reimagined, the state reordered, and norms of citizenship
restructured.
I
MIGRATION AND THE COLONIAL ENCOUNTER

The two basic features of the modern world system furnish the
essential framework within which to parse out the determinants
of migrations and constructions of migrant identities. These features are the increasing incorporation of different parts of the
world into a single division of labor in the capitalist world-economy 6 and the construction of political units under the organizing
principle of the sovereign nation-state. 7 As a result of these two
features, the modern world system exhibits two dominant imperatives: establishing sovereignty and expanding levels of exchange.8 The fundamental tension between these two tendencies
has crucial implications for questions of migration and identity.

The sovereignty impulse locates the citizen within firm territorial
6

See generally SAMIR

AMIN, ACCUMULATION ON A WORLD SCALE: A CRITIQUE

OF THE THEORY OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT (Brian Pearce trans., 1974); SAMIR AMIN,
IMPERIALISM AND UNEQUAL DEVELOPMENT (1977); SAMIR AMIN, UNEQUAL DEVELOPMENT: AN ESSAY ON THE SOCIAL FORMATION OF PERIPHERAL CAPITALISM
(Brian Pearce trans., 1976); ANDRE GUNDER FRANK, CAPITALISM AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA: HISTORICAL STUDIES OF CHILE AND BRAZIL (1967); IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, THE CAPITALIST WORLD-ECONOMY (1979).
A chief characteristic of the contemporary world system is that economic production
and trade increasingly take place on a transnational level, while populations are still
bound within territorial states by operations of citizenship and sovereignty. Aristide

R. Zolberg, InternationalMigrations in Political Perspective, in GLOBAL TRENDS IN
MIGRATION: THEORY AND RESEARCH ON INTERNATIONAL POPULATION MOVEMENTS 3 (Mary M. Kritz et al. eds., 1981). This discrepancy has created inconsistencies between the international flows of capital and labor. See SASKIA SASSEN, THE
MOBILITY OF LABOR AND CAPITAL: A STUDY IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND
LABOR FLOW (1988); ARGHIRI EMMANUEL, UNEQUAL EXCHANGE: A STUDY OF
THE IMPERIALISM OF TRADE (1972).

7 See R.B.J. Walker, Sovereignty, Identity, Community: Reflections on the Horizons of ContemporaryPoliticalPractice, in CONTENDING SOVEREIGNTIES: REDEFINING POLITICAL COMMUNITY 159, 159-60 (R.B.J. Walker & Saul H. Mendlovitz eds.,
1990) (discussing how the "formalization of state Sovereignty [i]s the primary constitutive principle of modern political life"); Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-states,Dual Re-

gimes, and Neoclassical Theory: InternationalJurisprudenceand the Third World, 41
INT'L ORG. 519 (1987) (noting that "sovereign statehood [is] the constitutive principle of international society").
8 See generally MICHAEL J. SHAPIRO, READING "ADAM SMITH": DESIRE, HISTORY AND VALUE

1-44 (1993);

IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, HISTORICAL CAPITALISM

(1983); David Held, Central Perspectives on the Modern State, in THE IDEA OF THE
MODERN STATE 29 (Gregor McLennan et al. eds., 1984).
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boundaries, constitutes individual and collective identities, privileges a homogeneous subjectivity eligible for political recognition, and posits identities of ineligible others. In contrast, the
exchange impulse encourages flows of capital, commodities, and
labor power, and thus demands the dilution of specifications of
eligible subjectivities and relaxation of territorial boundaries.
The conflict between exchangeand sovereignty comes into sharp
relief around questions of identity and location of the self. It involves a priority either of maintenance of order and control
within bounded spaces or of relaxation of territorial control in
order to facilitate circulation and exchange. However, the relationship between sovereignty and exchange is not one of simple
opposition. In particular settings, the sovereignty and exchange
imperatives can be either antagonistic, mutually reinforcing, or
relatively autonomous.
The genesis of the sovereignty and exchange imperatives of the
modern world are intrinsically linked to the historical experience
of the colonial encounter between the West and the rest. This
linkage is so fundamental that any discussion of sovereignty and
exchange must be framed in the context of the colonial encounter. The sovereignty doctrine directly grew out of the European
encounter with the colonized.9 It is not a construct that developed in Europe and was then diffused around the world. Rather,
it was fashioned as a legitimizing framework for colonial subjugation, was primarily concerned with the alterity the colonized native presented for the colonizer, and was "explicitly shaped in
such a manner as to empower certain cultures while suppressing
others."1 0 The sovereignty doctrine and its attending representations of the colonized native were then deployed in Europe itself.
Sovereignty furnished the scaffolding to construct the modern
state," one that is territorially bound, judicially defined, and
9 See Antony Anghie, Francisco de Vitoria and the Colonial Origins of International Law, 5 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 321 (1996).
10Id. at 333. See also ANTHONY PAGDEN, LORDS OF ALL THE WORLD: IDEOLOGIES OF EMPIRE IN SPAIN, BRITAIN AND FRANCE c.1500-c.1800 (1995); ROBERT A.
WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DIS-

COURSES OF CONQUEST (1990); Anthony D. King, Spaces of Culture, Spaces of
Knowledge, in CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION AND THE WORLD-SYSTEM (Anthony D.
King ed., 1991); Note, Aspiration and Control: InternationalLegal Rhetoric and the

Essentialization of Culture, 106 HARV. L. REv. 723 (1993).
11 It is important to bear in mind that "[i]t is unavoidable redundancy to speak of

the modern 'state,' for there is no other kind of state properly understood. No less is
it redundant to speak of the 'sovereign state,' and no less avoidable. Sovereignty
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equipped to "subvert and annex the primary loyalties attached to
more intimate collectivities."' 2 In Europe, colonial representations of native alterity concurrently facilitated imagining the undifferentiated "nation" as a rationale for the territorial sovereign
state, and subaltern classes of the continent were often understood in terms that derived their force from these representations.' 3 Similarly, the contours of the modern exchange
imperative were shaped in the context of Europe's outward expansion and colonial encounters. Capitalism did not mature
within the territorial bounds of Europe and then spread across
the globe. From the very beginning, capitalism as a mode of production and accumulation was tied to colonial penetration, a
global division of labor, and articulation with non-capitalist
modes of production. It is in this context that sovereignty served
as "a bridge between national capitalism and world capitalism."1 4
The interplay between exchange and sovereignty in the context
of the colonial encounter has a particular bearing on questions of
migration, identity, and political eligibility. While conventional
discourse on migration remains imprisoned within the territorial
imperative of the sovereign nation-state, locating the migrant in
inter/national imaginations necessitates an accounting of the colonial encounter and the traces of that encounter on the sovereignty/exchange dynamic. Locating a subject outside the
boundaries of the modern state "requires specific genealogical
recoveries which denaturalize those boundaries and thereby
destabilize discursive hegemonies attached to spatial configurations associated with the system of state sovereignty."' 5 This section aims to do just that by focusing on a particular site; that of
unproblematically defines the state as unique to modernity." Nicholas Greewood
Onuf, Sovereignty: Outline of a Conceptual History, 16 ALTERNATIVES 425, 426
(1991).
12 Arjun Appadurai, Patriotism and its Futures, 5 PUB. CULTURE 411, 414 (1993).
13 See generally EDWARD W. SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM (1993); EDWARD
W. SAID, ORIENTALISM (1978); ERIC R. WOLF, EUROPE AND THE PEOPLE WITHOUT
HISTORY (1982).
14
Joseph A. Camilleri, Rethinking Sovereignty in a Shrinking, Fragmented World,
in CONTENDING SOVEREIGNTIES: REDEFINING POLITICAL COMMUNITY 13, 38
(R.B.J. Walker & Saul H. Mendlovitz eds., 1990). See generally RICHARD ROSECRANCE, THE RISE OF THE TRADING STATE: COMMERCE AND CONQUEST IN THE

(1986); Roger Dale, Nation State and InternationalSystem: The
World System Perspective, in THE IDEA OF THE MODERN STATE 183 (Gregor McLennan et al. eds., 1984).
15 Michael J. Shapiro, Moral Geographies and the Ethics of Post-Sovereignty, 6
PUB. CULTURE 479, 482 (1994).
MODERN WORLD
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British colonial rule over the Indian subcontinent. Within this
site, I examine three specific migrations triggered by colonialism
to highlight their diverse determinants, processes, and impacts, as
well as the varied identities posited and deployed in the process.
The first migration is that of indentured labor from colonial India
to other parts of the British empire, as part of the single global
division of labor. The second migration is from colonial India as
part of resistance to colonial rule, propelled by notions of sovereignty, nationhood, and statehood which are incompatible with
their Eurocentric counterparts. The third migration is the one
triggered by the "divide and quit" end game of colonial rule, one
that partitioned India into two distinct "sovereign". "nationstates."
A.

Cheaper Than a Slave: Migration and Commodified Labor

Between 1834 and 1937, 30 million Indians left India as part of
16
the global division of labor, and just under 24 million returned.
Most of this migration formed part of the "coolie system" that
came into existence in the early nineteenth century, whereby
Asian labor, primarily from India and China, went to colonies
governed by Europeans to work on plantations, mines, railroads,
canals, and similar projects. The "coolie system" was a mixture
of various labor systems and stood somewhere between slavery
and "free" wage labor. 1 7 In the case of colonial India it included
indentured labor, the kangany system,1 8 the maistry system 19 and
99 tbl.35 (1951).
17 The slave trade from India, though on a relatively small scale, also formed part
of European colonial plantation economies until the end of the eighteenth century.
The Dutch began the direct slave trade from South India to Mauritius. In the late
eighteenth century, slaves from South India were regularly sold to French planters in
Mauritius and Reunion, even in the face of a 1789 proclamation by the Governor
General prohibiting the export of slaves. D.R. BANAJI, SLAVERY IN BRITISH INDIA
59, 171 (2nd ed. 1933); Hubert Gerbeau, Engagees and Coolies on Reunion Island:
Slavery's Masks and Freedom's Constraints, in COLONIALISM AND MIGRATION: IN16 KINGSLEY DAVIS, THE POPULATION OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN

DENTURED LABOUR BEFORE AND AFTER SLAVERY 211 (P.C. Emmer ed., 1986). By

1800 there were some 6,000 Indian slaves in Mauritius and 2,000 in Reunion. HUGH
TINKER, A NEW SYSTEM OF SLAVERY: THE EXPORT OF INDIAN LABOUR OVERSEAS
1830-1920 44 (1974).
18 The kangany system, used to recruit Indian labor for Ceylon and Malaya, was

oriented towards extended family structures: each kangany (headman), who was
himself an Indian immigrant, supervised a group of related coolies. See C.
KONDAPI, INDIANS OVERSEAS 1838-1949, at 29-46 (1951).
19 The maistry system was very similar to the kangany system except that it used
advances to bind the indebted labor. Additionally, the maistry system had an exten-
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penal transportation. 20 For purposes of this Article, I examine
only the indentured labor system, whereby 1.5 million Indians
went overseas between 1834 and 1920.
The indenture system formed part of the "unfree" labor systems that Robert Miles termed "an anomalous necessity" of the
early stage of global expansion of capitalist production and the
resulting articulation of different modes of production. 2 ' Viewed
on a global scale, "unfree" labor was the predominant form of
labor control until much later than might be supposed.22 This is
where "unfree" labor and migration intersect. The European
mercantile powers underwrote their trading empires by the production of tropical commodities and precious metals, and introduced mass slavery and coerced labor to the Americas to sustain
this production. 23 The triangular trade between Europe, Africa,
and the Americas was the precursor of modern global capitalism.
The main successor to modern slavery was the institution of insive hierarchical structure. The maistry system was used chiefly to recruit Indian
labor for Burma and Straits settlements. Id. at 46-52.
20 The rapid expansion of colonies and settlements in the Indian Ocean region
created a demand for labor to construct public works like roads, harbors, offices,
and jails. Convicts often performed this labor as a substitute for the death penalty
or long-term imprisonment. Convicts labored in Bencoolen in southeast Sumatra,
and from 1825 until 1873, in Penang, Singapore, and Mauritius. TINKER, supra note
17, at 45.
21

See generally ROBERT

MILES, CAPITALISM AND UNFREE LABOUR: ANOMALY

OR NECESSITY 196-222 (1987). His explanation for the survival and reproduction of

unfree methods of production in a world economic system increasingly dominated
by the capitalist mode of production is that under certain historical conditions:
(1) forms of unfree labour ... can be a constitutive element of the process
of primitive accumulation preceding the emergence of a capitalist mode of
production; (2) forms of unfree labour can exist because the commodification of labour power is either obstructed or breaks down; and (3) forms of
unfree labour can coexist with free labour where non-capitalist modes of
production are sustained in some form of interrelation with the capitalist
mode of production, either within or between different social formations.
Id. at 222.
22 Even in Europe, "free" labor (conceived in the sense of the freedom to choose
one's employer) did not become a dominant legal ideal until the late eighteenth
century and not the dominant paradigm until the nineteenth century. See generally
PHILIP D. CURTIN, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PLANTATION COMPLEX: ESSAYS IN
ATLANTIC HISTORY (1990); ORLANDO PATIERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH:

A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1982).
23 See generally ERIC WILLIAMS,

CAPITALISM AND SLAVERY (1961).
Native
American slavery was the first large-scale system in the history of capitalism to exploit the workers of conquered territories outside of Europe. In terms of its scale
and destructive significance, it exceeded the later enslavement of the African people. See LYDIA PoTrs, THE WORLD LABOUR MARKET: A HISTORY OF MIGRATION

9-31 (1990).
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dentured labor, which served as a bridge between slavery and
modern forms of contract labor.2 4 This switch in the form of labor also involved a switch in the source of the labor supply from
Africa to Asia. With this switch in location, another continent,
previously linked only by 25
trade, was more firmly integrated into
the modern world system.
The abolition of slavery and the emancipation of the slave population marked a turning point in the history of the colonial plantation. The British government passed the Act of Emancipation
in 1833, freeing a slave population of around 665,000 in the British Caribbean. 6 In the following years, slavery was similarly
abolished in the French (1848), Danish (1848), and Dutch (1863)
Caribbean. 27 The regional economy, which held a key position in
each respective imperial political economy, centered on labor-intensive plantation agriculture, especially sugar production.
Emancipation caused an immediate crisis among the planters,
who perceived their success as being founded upon a critical ratio
between abundant land and cheap labor-a ratio which slavery
had served well and which after abolition needed to be replaced
by "a new system of slavery. ' '28 Initially, the planters attempted
to employ ex-slaves as formal wage labor. Planters' unchanged
attitudes, however, ensured a rapid post-emancipation movement of ex-slaves away from estates, characterized as "a protest
24 See generally ROBIN COHEN, THE NEW HELOTS: MIGRANTS IN THE INTERNA-

4-32 (1987).
25 With the establishment of the coolie system, "it was the turn of the Asian peoples to become victims of exploitation and to be traded on the world market for
labour power. . . . The population of yet another continent was to be transformed
into a reservoir of labour power and shunted around the world." PoTrs, supra note
23, at 62.
26
See B.W. HIGMAN, SLAVE POPULATIONS OF THE BRITISH CARIBBEAN 1807TIONAL DIVISION OF LABOUR

1834 (1984). To ensure a stable supply of labor for the plantations, slavery was replaced with a system of forced apprenticeship whereby freed slaves were tied to
their former masters for four to six years. However, this system fell apart due to
new internal migrations: many former slaves quit the plantations of the coastal lowlands and settled the interior highlands. See generally ROBIN BLACKBURN, THE
OVERTHROW OF COLONIAL SLAVERY, 1776-1848 (1988); ERIC FONER, NOTHING

(1983); WILLIAM A. GREEN, BRITISH SLAVE EMANCIPATION: THE SUGAR COLONIES AND THE GREAT EXPERIMENT

BUT FREEDOM: EMANCIPATION AND ITS LEGACY

1830-1865 (1976); Nigel 0. Bolland, Systems of Dominationafter Slavery: The Control of Land and Labor in the British West Indies after 1838, 23 CoMP. STUD. IN
Soc'Y & HIST. 591 (1981).

supra note 17 passim.
28 1 adopt the phrase from the title of
27 TINKER,

TINKER,

supra note 17.
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against the inequalities of early 'freedom'."2 9 After abolition,
sugar production dramatically decreased and the market value of
Caribbean estates declined. Planters saw the labor shortage as

the heart of the problem, and soon initiated various immigration
schemes, including the introduction of Africans "liberated" from
other nations' slave ships and brought directly from other Carib-

bean islands or Africa. For various reasons, the planters found
none of these groups suitable. They demanded, instead, a wholly

controllable, extremely cheap workforce that was accustomed to
agricultural labor. Enter colonial India. Following the Battle of
Plassy in 1757, the British East India Company gained control of
Bengal, which was progressively expanded towards Central and
Southern India.3" By the end of the eighteenth century, the East
India Company was deploying Indian labor outside India.3 1 It

was in this context that in the 1820s sugar planters in Reunion
and Mauritius experienced some success in importing laborers
32
from India whose "cost [was] not one-half that of a slave.
Learning of such success, John Gladstone, representing Carib-

bean planters, contacted an English recruiting firm with a presence in Calcutta regarding the possibility of similarly obtaining
Indian labor for the Caribbean.33 The response of the firm was
29 D. Hall, The Flightfrom the Estates Reconsidered. The British West Indies, 183842, 10 J. CARIBBEAN HIST. 7, 23 (1978).
30 For a comprehensive account of consolidation of colonial rule in India between
1757 and 1857, see generally C.A. BAYLY, INDIAN SOCIETY & THE MAKING OF THE
BRITISH EMPIRE (1988); P.J. Marshall, Trade and Conquest: Studies on the Rise of
British Dominance in India in THE NEW CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF INDIA (Gordon
Johnson et al. eds., 1988).
31 The early attempt by the British East India Company to set up a trading station
in lower Burma in 1753-59 depended upon labor from India. The establishment of a
British port at Penang in 1786 was soon followed by the growth of an Indian colony.
The development of settlements in the Malacca Straits was founded upon the availability of an Indian labor force, described as "'but a modified form of slave trade."'
TINKER, supra note 17, at 44 (quoting Madras Government to Government of India,

in EMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS (1883)).

32 S.G. CHECKLAND, THE GLADSTONES: A FAMILY BIOGRAPHY 1764-1851, at 318
(1971) (quoting GEORGE ARBUTHNOT, CALCUTTA TO R.G. (1835)).
33 While making this inquiry, the January 1836 letter by John Gladstone, representing plantation interests to a shipping agency in Calcutta, explained the context
of the inquiry:
You will probably be aware that we are very particularly situated with our
Negro apprentices in the West Indies ... and that it is a matter of doubt
and uncertainty how they may be induced to continue their services on the
plantations after their apprenticeship expires in 1840. This is a subject of
great moment and deep interest in the colonies ....
It is of great importance to us to endeavour to provide a portion of other labourers, whom we
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encouraging: "'We are not aware that any greater difficulty
would present itself in sending men to the West Indies . . ., the
natives being perfectly ignorant of the place they go to or the
length of voyage they are undertaking."' 3 4 Thus started the systematic introduction of Indian indentured labor to the plantation
colonies of the Caribbean, and later to East Africa, South Africa,
and the South Pacific.
Before continuing, it must be noted that contingent constructions of subjects and identities were pivotal to this changing pattern of labor migration within the increasingly global division of
labor. Gladstone's letter reveals the motives behind the scheme:
besides providing cheap labor, the Indian workers were to be the
medium through which planters would reassert control and discipline over Afro-Caribbean workers. The unfolding of this stratagem was accompanied by enabling constructions of identities of
both African and Indian labor. Planters' claims that the AfroCaribbean labor available to them was inadequate numerically
and morally became orthodoxy: African workers were portrayed
as lazy, unreliable, untruthful, and unable or unwilling to understand or honor a contract.35 The reports of parliamentary and
royal commissions appointed to investigate the condition of the
sugar colonies, in almost every decade into the twentieth century,
reproduced and sanctified these portrayals. The significance of
the genealogy of these unfavorable representations of African labor, both for the introduction of indentured labor from India and
for the subsequent emergence of distinctive communities and
might use ...[to] make us, as far as it is possible, independent of our negro

population; and it has occurred to us that a moderate number of Bengalees,
such as you were sending to the Isle of France [Mauritius], might be very
suitable for our purpose.
Madhavi Kale, Projecting Identities: Empire and Indentured Labor Migration from
India to Trinidad and British Guyana, 1836-1885, in NATION AND MIGRATION: THE
POLITICS OF SPACE IN THE SOUTH ASIAN DIASPORA 73, 74-75 (Peter van der Veer
ed., 1995) (quoting John Gladstone). Gladstone informed the Calcutta company
that several similar importations had taken place from other places "and so far with

good effects on the minds of the blacks." Id. (emphasis added).
34 TINKER, supra note 17, at 63.
35 For myths about the work ethic of "natives" generated under colonial rule, see
generally SYED HUSSEIN ALATAS, THE MYTH OF THE LAZY NATIVE: A STUDY OF
THE IMAGE OF THE MALAYS, FILIPINOS AND JAVANESE FROM THE 16TH TO THE
20TH CENTURY AND ITS FUNCTION IN THE IDEOLOGY OF COLONIAL CAPITALISM

(1977); ROXANNE LYNN Dow, IMPERIAL ENCOUNTERS: THE POLITICS OF REPRESENTATION IN NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS (1996); DAVID SPURR, THE RHETORIC OF
EMPIRE: COLONIAL DISCOURSE IN JOURNALISM, TRAVEL WRITING, AND IMPERIAL
ADMINISTRATION

(1993).
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strained relations among them is considerable.3 6
The direct linkage between constructions of identities with the
exigencies of plantation economies, and the interconnection of
unstable and shifting identities of different labor groups, are central to this story of migration. Disparaging characterizations of
Afro-Caribbean labor were critical to constructing the identity of
Indian labor in the plantation colonies. The Indian workers were
extolled for their docility, industriousness, familiarity with agriculture, strong family ties, respect for authority, and respect for
the sanctity of contracts. These constructions, however, did not
last very long. Once Indians were on the plantations and had
adopted strategies of self-preservation and resistance, planters'
praises were leavened with distaste and dissatisfaction. Indians,
they now observed, were steadier workers than those of AfroCaribbean descent, but they were also avaricious, jealous, and
less robust, not to mention dishonest, idolatrous, and filthy.3 7 As
the catchment area of Indian labor expanded, corresponding
with the territorial expansion of colonial rule in India, planters
began to distinguish among labor from different parts of India.3 8
As dissatisfaction with Indians spread among the planters, and as
they began looking into opportunities to recruit workers from
China, the Indians came to be increasingly and unfavorably compared with the Chinese.3 9
36 Ethnic tensions and political conflicts between indigenous communities and descendants of Indian labor continue to animate the social and political landscape of
many postcolonial societies in the Caribbean, East Africa, South Africa, and Fiji.
See generally EXPULSION OF A MINORITY: ESSAYS ON UGANDAN ASIANS (Michael
Twaddle ed., 1975); MODERN CARIBBEAN POLITICS (Anthony Payne & Paul Sutton
eds., 1993); DONALD ROTHCHILD, RACIAL BARGAINING IN INDEPENDENT KENYA:
A STUDY OF MINORITIES AND DECOLONIZATION (1973); SELWYN D. RYAN, RACE
AND NATIONALISM IN TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO: A STUDY OF DECOLONIZATION IN A
MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY (1972); SOUTH ASIANS OVERSEAS: MIGRATION AND
ETHNICITy (Colin Clarke et al. eds., 1990).
37 A leading member of Trinidad's elite noted that, "The Hindoos ... are a mild
and timid race, obsequious, wanting in firmness and perseverance, more prudent
and wily than energetic and straightforward. They are intelligent, rather industrious
and saving." Kale, supra note 33, at 77-78 (internal quotation marks omitted).
38 One observer in Trinidad noted that indentured workers from Calcutta proved
to be "valuable, steady labourers, while those from Madras are for the most part
useless ... the scum and refuse of the city of Madras-stray waifs who have sunk
very low in their lives before they find their way into the hands of the shipping
agent." Id. at 78 (internal quotation marks omitted).
39 Chinese labor was portrayed as "'fully alive to the necessity of authority for
their regulation and control ... generally tractable and manageable,' strong, tough,
'not averse to foreigners' ... 'highly intelligent and discerning, steady laborers, and
well versed in the tillage of the soil."' Id. On Chinese migration see PERSIA CRAW-
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Characterizations of Indian labor were directly linked to the
role they were to play in the sugar colonies, in relation primarily
to Afro-Caribbean workers over whom planters were determined to reassert authority. The early consensus was that the
planter had "found in the meek Hindu a ready substitution for
the Negro slave he had lost."4 If India became the primary
recruiting ground for sugar colony planters, it was not because
Indians' characters, as laborers or otherwise, had made them
ideal immigrants; rather, it was because Indian workers were, for
political reasons, more readily accessible than workers from
other parts of the world. The claims that Indians were innately
suited to agricultural labor, to taking directions, and to working
hard for low wages were justifications for seeking and securing
Indian indentured workers, especially once other areas proved
inaccessible and importation of labor from India had become a
permanent strategy for sugar production on plantations.
In 1838, British Guyana was the first Caribbean territory to
receive indentured Indians; several other Caribbean colonies began importing Indian labor in succeeding years. Between 1838
and 1917, more than half a million Indians went to the Caribbean
as indentured labor.4 1 Though it started with the Caribbean
sugar plantations, the Indian indentured labor system was soon
extended to Africa and the South Pacific.42 The considerable expense of recruiting and shipping laborers from India to the West
FORD CAMPBELL, CHINESE COOLIE EMIGRATION

(1923),

CHING-HUANG YEN, Coo-

LIES AND MANDARINS (1985). In 1843, during a temporary phase when indentured

migration from India was banned, the British colonial secretary encouraged West
Indian sugar planters to recruit in China, provided they confined their efforts to
territories under British control. Kale, supra note 33, at 79.
40 P.C. Emmer, The Meek Hindu; The Recruitment of Indian Labourers for Service Overseas, 1870-1916, in COLONIALISM AND MIGRATION; INDENTURED LABOUR
BEFORE AND AFTER SLAVERY 187 (P.C. Emmer ed., 1986).
41 G.W. Roberts and J. Byrne, Summary Statistics on Indenture and Associated
MigrationAffecting the West Indies, 1834-1918, 20 POPULATION STUDIES 125 (1966).
42 See generally, SURENDRA BHANA & Joy B. BRAIN, SETTING DOWN ROOTS:
INDIAN MIGRANTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 1860-1911 (1990); KENNETH L. GILLION, FIJI'S
INDIAN MIGRANTS: A HISTORY TO THE END OF INDENTURE IN 1920 (1962); K.
HAZAREESINGH, HISTORY OF INDIANS IN MAURITIUS (1975); Joy Brain, Indentured
and Free Indians in the Economy of Colonial Natal, in ENTERPRISE AND EXPLOITATION IN A VICTORIAN COLONY: ASPECTS OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HISTORY

(Bill Guest and John M. Sellers eds., 1985); Brij V. Lal,
Labouring Men and Nothing More: Some Problems of Indian Indenture in Fiji, in
INDENTURED LABOUR IN THE BRITISH EMPIRE 1834-1920 126 (Kay Saunders ed.,
1984); M.D. North-Coombes, Indentured Labour in the Sugar Industries of Natal and
Mauritius, 1834-1910, in ESSAYS ON INDENTURED INDIANS IN NATAL 12 (Surendra
Bhana ed., 1990).
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Indies was originally met in its entirety by local colonial governments; over subsequent years, however, planters were required
to pay an increasing share of these costs. Initially, recruiting and
transportation of such labor were unregulated. In 1837, however,
the colonial government of India, under Act V of 1837, laid down
specific conditions and an accompanying administrative framework.4 3 This legislation, while institutionalizing the system of indentured labor and bringing it under political supervision, took
pains to ensure that, pro forma, the system was one of "free"
labor based on contract.44 The difference between indentured
and "free" labor, however, was quite clear to planters, one of
whom stated, "'We want Indians as indentured laborers but not
as free men."' 45 Indenture was akin to what we would now call a
standard form contract, and the rights and duties embodied in it
were not negotiated or negotiable by the migrant. The sanctions
for breach of terms by the migrant were penal, not civil, denying
the form of his contractual engagement. An extensive set of regulations defined the terms of engagement and tied him to a particular employer and a particular residence. The extensive
regulation and the lack of legal capacity of the migrant to change
employment meant that this form of labor, like slavery, was not
driven by market rationality and did not fulfill the classic liberal
criteria of free alienation of labor power.
Under license from the Protector of Emigrants46 in Calcutta
and Madras, emigration agencies sought recruits throughout the
Indian countryside. While there is little evidence of fraud, deception or kidnapping being widely used to gain indentured migrants, many Indians did not fully understand all the implications
43 The intending emigrant was to appear before a designee of the colonial government, along with the emigration agent, who was required to produce a written statement of the terms of the contract. The length of service was to be five years,
renewable for another five. The emigrant was to be returned to the port of departure at the end of his service. Vessels taking the emigrants were required to conform
to specified standards of space, diet, and health. The superintendent of police was
charged with carrying out the duties under the Act. TINKER, supra note 17, at 64.
44 For a comparative study of legal frameworks that accompanied migrations of
slave labor, indentured labor, and modern free labor, see Yash Ghai, Migrant Workers, Markets, and the Law, in GLOBAL HISTORY AND MIGRATIONS 145 (Wang

Gungwu ed., 1997).
note 18, at 7 (internal citation omitted).
46 This office was created by the Indian colonial authorities to administer the indentured labor system. The counterpart in the plantation colonies was named Protector of Immigrants. The latter position replaced the Protector of Slaves. See
45 KONDAPI, supra

TINKER, supra note 17, at 18, 105.
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of indentureship and migration.4 7 The colonial encounter furnished both the "pull" and "push" factors for labor migration. A
historical assessment of the conditions prevailing in India during
British rule reveals a crucial connection between colonial entrenchment and the international commodification of Indian labor. The transportation en masse of Indians through the
indenture system was a direct consequence of British penetration
into the entire economic and social fabric of Indian society. Socalled "push factors" probably had more to do with migrants' decisions to indenture themselves abroad than did "pull factors" of
promised opportunities. In the second half of the nineteenth
century, peasants throughout India faced privations due to colonial emphasis on export-oriented agriculture and massive disruption of livelihoods with the demise of traditional industries,
relocated local economies, new demands of cash payments for
upwardly spiraling rents, a high incidence of evictions, and widespread unemployment.4 8
Rather than being an avenue of opportunity, for the majority
of Indians indenture was an "exile into bondage" as "many found
they had exchanged one form of poverty and servitude for another, and many more found only death and disease."4 9 It is important to note that indigenous people of the plantation colonies
had little say in the induction of Indian labor, a fact that was to
have a profound effect on future inter-ethnic relations. The colonial authorities regulated the recruitment, importation, allocation, and employment of labor; control over the repressive
apparatus, such as the courts, police, and prisons, all of which
acted to repress workers, was also in their hands. Despite regional variation, it is possible to paint a general picture of plantation life which remained unchanged from the days of slavery.
47

Steven Vertovee, Indian Indentured Migration to the Caribbean, in

THE CAM-

BRIDGE SURVEY OF WORLD MIGRATION 57, 59 (Robin Cohen ed., 1995) (internal
citation omitted). See also COLONIALISM AND MIGRATION; INDENTURED LABOUR
BEFORE AND AFTER SLAVERY 187-207 (P.C. Emmer ed., 1986); I.M. CUMPSTON,
INDIANS OVERSEAS IN BRITISH TERRITORIES

1834-1854 (1953).

48 For the impact of colonialism on the economy of India, see B.M. BHATIA, FAMINES IN INDIA

(1963); P.J. CAIN & A.G. HOPKINS,
1688-1914, at 316-350 (1993);

TION AND EXPANSION

RULE AND THE INDIAN ECONOMY

1800-1914 (1982);

BRITISH IMPERIALISM: INNOVANEIL CHARLESWORTH, BRITISH
WILLIAM

G.

HYNES, THE Eco-

NOMICS OF EMPIRE: BRITAIN, AFRICA AND THE NEW IMPERIALISM

1870-95 (1979);

DIETMAR ROTHERMUND, AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF INDIA: FROM PRE-COLONIAL
TIMES TO 1986 (1988); DIETMAR ROTHERMUND, THE INDIAN ECONOMY UNDER
BRITISH RULE AND OTHER ESSAYS
49 TINKER, supra note 17, at 60.

(1983).
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Indenture, like slavery, was premised on an elaborate system
of coercion that restricted the free movement of laborers outside
the estates; it not only regulated their labor power but also isolated them on plantations. Planters deployed many formal and
informal systems of control not only to confine workers on the
estates but also to keep them in indenture.5 0 In Natal and Mauritius, for example, an annual tax was introduced to force workers
to reindenture; vagrancy laws and licenses were imposed to restrict worker mobility outside the plantation and to reduce the
alternatives available upon termination of contract. While the
stipulated conditions of work, pay, housing, and medical facilities
were similar for all the colonies, in reality their interpretation
was left to the discretion of employers, overseers, and managers.
The everyday reality for workers was marked by grinding overwork, low wages, malnutrition, persistent illness, and poor housing, as well as a range of punitive measures that included
beatings, fines, and imprisonment. The colonial administrations
functioned in the interests of the employers rather than to protect workers. In Mauritius between 1849 and 1862, for example,
the administration acted on the planters' behalf by arbitrarily reducing wages and lengthening indenture contracts from one to
three and then to five years. Conditions of contracts were enforced harshly through labor-coercive techniques, such as those
in Mauritius, where workers could be imprisoned for up to six
months for desertion, neglect of work or indolence, and where
refusal to obey an order could result in the loss of two weeks' pay
or imprisonment with hard labor. Legislation introduced to improve the workers' conditions was often ineffectual and commissions investigating worker abuse rarely made recommendations
detrimental to planters. The Protectors of Immigrants were frequently friends of the planters and shared their class background
and interests. The colonial authorities and sugar planters colluded to draw "a cloak of secrecy over actual conditions on the
estates and in whitewashing the system."'" The harshness of conditions for the indentured Indians is evidenced by a very high
rate of suicide, a third of which took place in the first year of
indenture. In Natal, for example, the rate was sixty-four per
50 See Maureen Swan, Indentured Indians: Accommodation and Resistance, 18901913, in ESSAYS ON INDENTURED INDIANS IN NATAL 117 (Surendra Bhana ed.,
1990).
51 North-Coombes, supra note 42, at 39.

Migration, Identity, & the Colonial Encounter

thousand.52
While the experience of Indian women under indenture has
remained under-explored, some generalizations are possible
based on available information.5 3 Although they performed
many crucial productive and reproductive functions, employers
were reluctant to recruit women, whom they viewed as a burden.
Women received a fraction of the male wage and half of the rations allotted to men. Women also played a critical sexual role
and many were subjected to intense oppression. The paucity of
women (the ratio of women to men was 40:100 in Natal and
33:100 in Mauritius) 54 led to much sexual harassment and even
murder of "unfaithful" wives. In Fiji, for example, between 1885
and 1921, 230 cases of murder due to "sexual jealousy" were
recorded.
The structural conditions of indenture, adverse working conditions, and persistent abuse frequently led to worker action, which
manifested itself in a variety of passive and active ways through
formal and informal acts.56 Most protest was expressed through
day-to-day actions. In Fiji, for instance, Indians acquired a reputation for their "murderous intent:" thirty-two charges of assault
on overseers were brought against workers in 1900, resulting in
eleven convictions; in 1902, there were thirty-five charges with
twenty-eight convictions. Mass worker protests took place in
Mauritius in 1872. There was a strike and protest march in Fiji in
1886 and a general strike in Natal in 1913. Indentured laborers
developed an array of forms of everyday resistance 57 and avoid52 Ravinder K. Thiara, Indian Indentured Workers in Mauritius, Natal and Fiji, in
THE CAMBRIDGE SURVEY OF WORLD MIGRATION 63, 67 (Robin Cohen ed., 1995).
53 See generally, Jo Beall, Women Under Indenture in Natal, in ESSAYS ON INDENTURED INDIANS IN NATAL 89-116 (Surendra Bhana ed., 1990); Verene A. Shephard,
Indian Women in Jamaica, 1845-1945, in INDENTURE AND EXILE: THE INDO-CARIBBEAN EXPERIENCE 100 (Frank Birbalsing ed., 1989).

54 North-Coombes, supra note 42, at 12.
55 Brij V. Lal, Labouring Men and Nothing More: Some Problems of Indian Indenture in Fiji, in INDENTURED LABOUR IN THE BRITISH EMPIRE 1834-1920, at 126,
148 (Kay Saunders ed., 1984).
56 On resistance by indentured labor, see Maureen Swan, Indentured Indians: Accommodation and Resistance, 1890-1913, in ESSAYS ON INDENTURED INDIANS IN
NATAL 117 (Surendra Bhana ed., 1990); Kusha Haraksingh, Control and Resistance
among Indian Workers: A Study of Labour on the Sugar Plantations of Trinidad,
1875-1917, in INDIAN IN THE CARIBBEAN 61 (David Dabydeed & Brinsley Samaroo
eds., 1987).
57 According to James Scott, everyday resistance consists of:
[T]he ordinary weapons of relatively powerless groups: foot dragging, dissimulation, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson,
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ance protest. 58 These included absenteeism, idleness, petty lar-

ceny, destruction of employers' property and tools, desertion,
and drunkenness. Workers also established a system of self-help

by setting up funds based on voluntary subscriptions that were
used to pay fines. Free Indians frequently harbored deserters.
Resistance by the indentured labor was often met with stringent
legislation aimed at deterring collective action, and those perceived as protest leaders were invariably criminalized and banished. 59 Nevertheless, labor resistance, however expressed,
persisted and grew stronger as 6laborers
became more accus0
environment.
new
their
to
tomed
Resistance by indentured labor was not the only factor that
injected instability into the system. The history of indentured migration from India is complex because the British government,
the colonial governments of India and plantation colonies, and
the plantation owners were all involved and had fluctuating and
often conflicting demands. Although the state organized the syssabotage and so forth. These Brechtian forms of class struggle have certain
features in common. They require little or no co-ordination or planning;
they often represent a form of individual self-help; and they typically avoid
any direct symbolic confrontation with authority or with elite norms. To
understand these commonplace forms of resistance is to understand what
much of the peasantry does "between revolts" to defend its interests as
best it can.
JAMES C. Sco'TT, WEAPONS OF THE WEAK: EVERYDAY FORMS OF PEASANT RESIST-

29 (1985).
58 Michael Adas argues that through avoidance protest "dissatisfied groups seek
to attenuate their hardships and express their discontent through flight, sectarian
withdrawal, or other activities that minimize challenges to or clashes with those
whom they view as their oppressors." Michael Adas, From Avoidance to Confrontation: Peasant Protestin Precolonialand Colonial Southeast Asia, in 23 COMP. STUD.
ANCE

IN SOC'Y AND HIST. 217 (1981).

In a later work, Adas portrays these avoidance

protests in more detail. There are:
Flight[s] to sparsely settled frontier areas or the domains of rival patrons,
banditry, formal petitions, 'sit-ins' before the residences of state officials, as
well as clandestine retributive acts involving crop and implement destruction or arson and 'witchcraft'

. . ..

These modes of defence and protest are

far more dramatic and dangerous than everyday acts of defiance and retribution and much more disruptive, even dangerous, for the social systems in
which they occur.
Michael Adas, South Asian Resistance in Comparative Perspective, in CONTESTING
POWER: RESISTANCE AND EVERYDAY SOCIAL RELATIONS IN SOUTH ASIA 290, 298
(Douglas Haynes & Gyan Prakash eds., 1991).
59 Defending a repressive 1867 ordinance, the Procureur-General of Mauritius
stated: "The Indians require to be protected against themselves." TINKER, supra
note 17, at 242.
60 Haraksingh, supra note 56, at 61-80.
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tern on behalf of the plantation owners' interests, these were not
the only interests to which the state responded. The Colonial Office in London was sensitive to continuing agitation by the antislavery movement.6 1 Colonial authorities in India had to contend with groups of local reformers, belonging to both the Indian
and British communities, who became involved with the indenture migration from its very inception. In response to their demands, they convened a "Committee appointed to inquire
respecting the exportation of Hill Coolies" in 1838.62 In light of
the committee's report, the Governor-General's council passed
Act XIV of 29 May 1839, whereby overseas emigration for manual labor was prohibited and any person effecting such an emigration became liable to a fine of two hundred rupees or three
months of imprisonment.6 3 Within two years of its initiation, the
indenture system came to a sudden halt. In the following years,
the planting interests and the anti-slavery groups vied intensely
for the hearts and minds of the British public and legislators.
The planters' first success came in 1842 when the colonial government repealed the prohibition on emigration to Mauritius,
followed by legalization of emigration to the Caribbean in 1844.64
This concession to the planters was balanced by limiting the indenture period to one year. A struggle over the time limit of
indenture ensued, and in 1862 the British Government accepted
five-year contracts, extendible by another five years, for all sugar
61 While rejecting an 1835 draft of a Mauritius ordinance defining the terms of
indenture upon which Indian labor was to be imported, Lord Glenelg, the Secretary
for the Colonies, said:
The design of the law might more accurately have been described as the
substitution of some new coercion for that state of slavery which had been
abolished; the effect of it, at least, is to establish a compulsory system
scarcely less rigid, and in some material respects even less equitable than
that of slavery itself.
TINKER,

supra note 17, at 17 (quoting

EMIGRATION FROM INDIA; THE EXPORT OF

29 (1842)). The Aborigines Protection Society was established in 1837 and in 1839 the British and Foreign AntiSlavery Society was founded. Both groups drew upon the support of old abolitionists and emancipators. The Order in Council of July 12, 1837, that legalized the venture proposed by Gladstone was first published in the anti-slavery journal British
Emancipator. This prompted questions in the Parliament, and a Natives of India
Protection Bill was placed before Parliament. Another Order in Council of 1938
limited the duration of the labor contract to one year and required the contract to be
executed within the colony where the indentured person would serve his time. See
COOLIES AND OTHER LABOURERS, TO MAURITIUS

TINKER, supra note 17, at 64.
62 TINKER, supra note 17, at
63 TINKER,

64 TINKER,

66.
supra note 17, at 69.
supra note 17, at 73-75, 80-81.
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colonies. Emigration to Mauritius was again suspended in 1856
following eighty-one deaths among a shipload of Indians abandoned on an island off the north coast of Mauritius. A by-product of this incident was the Indian Act XIX of 1856, empowering
the Governor-General to suspend emigration to any territory
where he had cause to believe that conditions for the Indians
were unsatisfactory.6 5 For the next sixty years, the system continued to operate with only minor modifications. But during this
time it remained a system criticized by a host of forces. Antislavery societies, some colonial administrators, and the developing Indian nationalist movement all kept the indentured system
in public view.
The crucial role of the indenture system in the forging of an
Indian identity and the development of Indian nationalism has
remained largely unexamined. While a detailed exposition is beyond the scope of this Article, a few observations are in order.
Empire and imperialism are not only territorial and economic
but inevitably also a subject-constituting project. Indentured labor transported from the Indian subcontinent became "Indian"
in the context of its sandwiched placement with regards to both
its European employers and indigenous populations. Identity is
always related to what one is not-the other; identity is conceivable only in and through difference. Spatial identities are
powerfully shaped by the accompanying processes of deterritorialization and displacement. In pre-colonial India, identities coalesced around religious, caste, ethnic, linguistic, and regional
differences. In the indenture system the diverse and heterogeneous labor drawn from India found itself similarly positioned by
this regime of colonial economy. Institutional and discursive
practices accompanying indenture constituted this heterogeneity
as a singularity. Religious, ethnic, linguistic and regional differences were also downplayed by the indentured as they forged a
collective identity in resistance to a shared experience of a singular form of colonial oppression. Indian identity, thus, became a
field of possibility through suppression of internal difference, at
least temporarily, occasioned by similarities of conditions created
by the colonial regime of indentured labor. The construction of
an Indian identity in the terrain of the indenture system, in turn,
had two direct impacts on the evolution of a nationalist movement in India: one, the indenture system furnished the first sus65 TINKER,

supra note 17, at 91.
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tained target for the nationalist movement during its embryonic
phase, and, two, Mohandas K. Gandhi, the leading Indian nationalist leader, developed his political philosophy and political tac-

tics in the context of his direct involvement with the Indian
66
indentured labor in South Africa.
In the early twentieth century, the nascent nationalist move66

See generally ROBERT A. HUrTENBACK, GANDHI IN SOUTH AFRICA: BRITISH
IMPERIALISM AND THE INDIAN QUESTION, 1860-1914 (1971); BRIDGLAL PACHAI,
THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN INDIAN QUESTION, 18601971 (1971).

A recent account of the support provided by the Indian plantation workers in
Southeast Asia, many descendants of indentured labor, to the anti-colonial Indian

Independence League and the rebel Indian National Army during the Second World
War captures the connection between diasporic existence and national identity
graphically:
The most enthusiastic recruits and supporters of the Indian National Army

came from an entirely different quarter-Tamil workers of Malaya's rubber plantations ....
Throughout Japanese-occupied Southeast Asia-not
just Malaya but Thailand, French Indochina, and Burma as well-Indians
sought out the league's offices. This rallying together seemed to happen
spontaneously, even though the Indians of the region were a disparate
group. They were divided by language, ethnicity, caste, and religion.
Before the war, they would never have gathered under the same roof: they
worshipped in different places, ate different kinds of food, and belonged to
different clubs, unions, and associations. Still, at this moment of crisis they
invented a collective identity centered on the cause of a land that some of
them, as second- and third-generation expatriates, had never seen ....
I
talked to many who had grown up in and around the rubber estates. "Slavery" was the term they invariably used to describe the life of prewar plantation workers. Many of these workers joined the rebel army because they
saw a direct connection between their own situation and that of their country of origin: they believed that they would never be treated with respect as
long as India remained a colony. For them the rebellion was something
like a Jacquerie-a peasant revolt. The men and women I met wept, almost without exception, as they recalled the exhilaration of those days.
This was the first time in their lives that they had been something other
than an invisible underclass; in the rebel training camps, living with people
of many different castes, regions, and religions, many had their first experience of comradeship. In a Kuala Lumpur caf6, an eighty-year-old man who
had almost died fighting in Burma told me, with tears streaming down his
cheeks, "I had no one here in Malaya, no family-nothing. In the Indian
National Army I found myself surrounded by brothers and sisters. We all
ate together-there were no differences between us. There were so many
of us, but we were the children of one mother. If I am reborn ten times, I
will not know such happiness again."
Amitav Ghosg, India's Untold War of Independence, THE NEW YORKER 104, 115
(June 23 & 30, 1997). See also, PETER WARD FAY, THE FORGOTTEN ARMY: INDIA'S

ARMED STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE 1942-45 (1993); Keya Ganguly, Migrant
Identities: PersonalMemory and the Construction of Selfhood, 6 CULTURAL STUDIES
27 (January 1992); Caren Kaplan, Deterritorializations:The Rewriting of Home and
Exile in Western Feminist Discourse, 6 CULTURAL CRITIQUE 187 (1987).
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ment in India initiated a direct assault on the system. This phase

of resistance was partly prompted by moves of the white settlers
in Natal to redesign the indenture system. The demographic distribution was of concern to the white settlers; while they wanted
continued access to indentured Indian labor, they wanted to ensure that it did not exceed the white population.6 7 Natal wanted

the Indian colonial government to restructure the indenture system so that reindenture for five years would be compulsory, at

the end of which the indentured must accept return passage. The
colonial government in India capitulated to the South African
settlers' views. In 1895, the Natal legislature went further and
imposed a special tax on local Indians after their period of indenture ended. This is what prompted widespread agitation
spearheaded by Gandhi, who had recently settled in South Africa. Gandhi drafted a petition to the Secretary of Colonies protesting the treatment of Indians in Natal and concluding that
"'[i]f the Colony cannot put up with the Indians, the only course
...is to stop . . .future immigration to Natal."' 68 The British

government, however, chose to accept the actions of the Natal
legislature and formally declared that white settler colonies had a
right to control migration of Indians and Chinese.69 On the other
hand, the colonial government of India, which was increasingly
sensitive to public opinion in India, started to take public notice
of concerns of indentured labor regarding conditions of work,
special taxes, right to return, and civil rights.7" In 1905, the In67 It was claimed by the white settlers that in 1894 the population of Natal included 470,000 Africans, 45,000 whites, and 46,000 Indians. TINKER, supra note 17,
at 281.
68 TINKER, supra note 17, at 284.
69 Joseph Chamberlain announced at the 1897 Imperial Conference:
We quite sympathize with the determination of the white inhabitants of
these Colonies which are in comparatively close proximity to millions and
hundreds of millions of Asiatics that there should not be an influx of people alien in civilisation, alien in religion, alien in customs, whose influx
moreover would most seriously interfere with the legitimate rights of the
existing [European] labour population ....
TINKER, supra note 17, at 285.
70 Symptomatic of the concern held by colonial authorities is the following January 1908 communication from John Morley, Secretary for India to Lord Minto, Viceroy of India:
The great topic of the hour is the question of Asiatics in the Transvaalonly a part, however, of one of the largest questions concerning the Empire
as a whole and indeed not only the Empire but all white governments
against all yellow, brown and black immigrants. It is and will grow to be
more and more a World question, if ever there was one.
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dian National Congress adopted a formal resolution protesting
the treatment of Indians in South Africa and "called for retaliatory measures by 'the Government of India and His Majesty's
Government ... by prohibiting, if necessary, the emigration of
indentured labour."' 7 1 A commission to investigate the indenture system set up by the Natal government declared that Indians
were "undesirable in this colony other than as labor" and recommended termination of all future indentures. 72 The colonial Legislative Council of India, prompted by the Indian members,
banned emigration to Natal in 1910.7 1 In 1915, Gandhi moved
back to India and the anti-indenture movement gained further
momentum. In 1916, Indian members moved the Legislative
Council to abolish the indenture system completely. The colonial
government agreed to the abolition in principle, on the condition
that "'the existing system . . . be maintained . . . until proper
safeguards in the Colonies should have been provided and until
they should have had reasonable time to adjust themselves to the
change."' 74 Continued migration of indentured labor forced Indian nationalists to step up their anti-indenture campaign. The
continuing war in Europe added pressure on the system, including the question of safe passage. The Indian colonial government
formally declared the indenture labor system abolished in 1920. 75
One author has argued that "the phasing out of indenture had
more to do with the internal dissolution of the system in the context of a crisis in the world sugar economy than to the opposition
of pressure groups, whether located within the colonies or
outside them."' 76 While there is some merit to the claim, it is generally recognized that "the volte-face of the colonial authorities
in India ... was mainly caused by the new weight which the Indian nationalists carried during the First World War."' 7 7 The risHUGH TINKER, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: INDIA AND THE INDIAN IN THE BRITISH

COMMONWEALTH 1920-1950, at 23-4 (1976).
71 TINKER, supra note 17, at 300. In 1909 Indians in Mauritius started a political
journal named "Hindusthani" with the motto: "Liberty of Individuals! Fraternity of
Men!! Equality of Races!!!" TINKER, supra note 17, at 307.
72 TINKER, supra note 17, at 313.
73 TINKER, supra note 17, at 313.
74 TINKER, supra note 17, at 344.
75 Formal decisions were delayed by the lingering problems with Fiji, where demand for plantation labor remained strong but issues regarding treatment of postindentured Indians became a major political issue in India. See GILLION, supra note
42.
76
North-Coombes, supra note 42, at 43.
77 Emmer, supra note 40, at 203.
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ing interests of the Indian capitalists also clashed with the system
of overseas indentured emigration, which reduced the competition on the supply side of the Indian labor market both in agriculture and in the newly developing industrial sector.78 The
causes of the demise of the indentured labor system in colonial
India were multiple, substantiating the observation that "[i]n
human history there is always something beyond the reach of
dominating systems, no matter how deeply they saturate society,
and this is obviously what makes change possible." 79
The rise and fall of migration of indentured labor in colonial
India suggest some broad conclusions. The increasing commodification of Indian labor and its injection into the global division of labor was a result of the incorporation of colonial India
into the capitalist world economy. Colonial penetration and distortion of India's socio-economic structures, as well as the establishment of tropical plantation colonies, accounted for both the
"push" and "pull" factors in this migration. The ebb and flow of
this migration was facilitated by enabling constructions of varied,
and even contradictory, identities of Indian labor. Emigration
policy-making to manage indentured labor flow was a contested
field, and the resulting legal frameworks remained contingent
and unstable. While imperatives of the global division of labor
furnished the primary context for this migration and attendant
legal regimes, the political, cultural, and moral interests of concerned parties had to be continually addressed. Labor-demand
exigencies guided shifting constructions of identities of different
groups. These constructions, while serving the needs of the plantation owners, created division and conflict between different
ethnic and racial groups among the workers. A legacy of these
divisions is the continuing political conflicts between indigenous
populations and Indian settlers in Africa, the Caribbean, and the
South Pacific. At the level of global capitalism, the experience of
indentured labor demonstrated that "free" and "unfree" forms of
labor could be successfully and profitably combined in the global
capitalist system.
78 In fact, Indian industrialist and financier, Ratan Tata, gave financial assistance
to the anti-indenture movement, generally, and to the Transvaal passive resistance
fund, in particular. See TINKER, supra note 17, at 326. The impact of the First
World War on Indian industrialization was dramatic. See P.J. CAIN & A.G. HOPKINS,
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B.

Identity Beyond Territory: Migration and Resistance

From May to August in 1920, nearly 100,000 Muslims from
Northwestern India moved through the Khyber Pass bent on
crossing the border from colonial India into Afghanistan, ostensibly to fulfill their religious duty to migrate from a Dar-ul-Harb
(house of war) to a Dar-ul-Islam (house of Islam).8" About seventy-five percent of these migrants later returned to India; others
stayed in Afghanistan or scattered to Turkey and Russia. A large
number perished through exhaustion, hunger and disease. This
episode, known in the history of colonial India as the Hijrat (Migration) Movement, offers a unique context within which to examine the interrelated questions of migration, identity, and
politics.
Implicated by this use of migration as an instrument of political protest are interpretations of Islam, the conjuncture of anticolonial movement in India, the aftermath of the First World
War, particularly the demise of the Turkish Ottoman Empire,
and the geo-politics of the Central Asian region. This migration
as resistance posited constructions of sovereignty, nationhood,
and statehood incompatible with those forwarded by the modern
Eurocentric discourses of the sovereign nation-state. In the process, the migrants constituted and deployed identities relatively
autonomous of both the sovereignty and exchange imperatives of
the modern world system. This migration also involved a passionate deployment of religion as politics in a mode inaccessible
to modern discourses of enlightenment and rationality. Because
the story of this migration involves Islam and Muslims, its narration should not contribute to pervasive essentialist views of Islam
and Muslims, which are ironically shared by both passionate advocates and virulent detractors of Islam. This story substantiates
the position that "there are as many Islams as there are situations
that sustain it."'" Islam is not immune from history, which, in
80 Estimates of the numbers involved range from seventy thousand to two million.
The literature dealing directly with this migration is sparse. See DIETRICH REETZ,
HIJRAT: THE FLIGHT OF THE FAITHFUL, A BRITISH FILE ON THE ExoDus OF MUSLIM PEASANTS FROM NORTH INDIA TO AFGHANISTAN IN 1920 (1995); Lal Baha, The
Hijrat Movement and the North-West Frontier Province, 18 ISLAMIC STUD. 231
(1979); F.S. Briggs, The Indian Hijrat of 1920, 20 MUSLIM WORLD 164 (1930); M.
Naeem Qureshi, The Ulama of British India and the Hijrat of 1920, 13 MODERN
ASIAN STUD. 41 (1979).
81 AzIz AL-AZMEH, ISLAMS AND MODERNITIES 1 (1993).
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turn, is a process of discontinuities and ruptures rather than one
of a progressive linear evolution. This migration involves a particular historical articulation of Islam by a relatively small group
of Indian Muslims in the face of indifference, disagreement, and
even opposition by most Indian Muslims.
Without the conceptual arsenal furnished by Islam, both as a
religious doctrine and as a lived experience, the Hijrat Movement would not have been possible. Salient among these are the
concepts of migration, sovereignty, nationhood, and state. The
experience of "hijrat," which translates in Arabic as "migration,"
is central to Islamic history due to the migration of the Prophet
Mohammad and his followers from Mecca to Medina in 622
A.D., where they established the first Muslim proto-state.8 2 The
Islamic Hijri ("of migration") calendar ensues from this date.
Because the practice of the Prophet forms part of the sources of
law in Islamic jurisprudence and because emulating the deeds of
the Prophet is considered desirable conduct, the practice of hijrat
has always had an august place in Islamic cosmology. 83 This migration, by renouncing territorial, tribal, and even familial ties in
order to establish a political community based on a shared religious belief, symbolically demarcates the basic contours of one
classical Islamic position regarding questions of sovereignty, nationhood, and state.
The Prophet's migration is traditionally read by many Muslims
to be a statement that an appropriate political order of the Muslim community is essential to the fulfillment of public and private
obligations of the believers and that for Muslims there is no separation between religion and politics. 8 4 Because the purpose of
the political order is to institutionalize the shared religious beliefs of the Muslims, the glue that binds the community is shared
ert D. Lee ed. & trans., 1994); ISLAMIC LAW: SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXTS
(Aziz AI-Azmeh ed., 1988).
82 This migration followed attempts to find other suitable destinations for migra-

tion. Emissaries were sent to Abyssinia to explore the prospects of that location.
See MARTIN LINGS, MUHAMMAD: HIS LIFE BASED ON THE EARLIEST SOURCES 8184 (1983); W. MONTGOMERY WAT-r, MUHAMMAD: PROPHET AND STATESMAN 65-70
(1961). For a general biography of Muhammad, see MAXIME RODINSON, MOHAMMED (Anne Carter trans., 1971).
83 See generally NOEL J. COULSON, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW (1964); FAZLUR
RAHMAN, ISLAM (1979).
84 For traditional readings of Islamic views of politics and the state, see MUHAMMAD ASAD, THE PRINCIPLES OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT IN ISLAM
ESPOSITO, ISLAM AND POLITICS

(1984).

(1961);
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religion, rather than shared race, language, territory, culture, or
history. For many Muslims the primary "belonging" is to the
'ummah, the worldwide community of people who embrace the
teachings of the Qur'an and the practice of Islam. As a corollary, the state, as an organized political expression of the 'ummah, cannot be coterminous with fixed territorial demarcations.
The borders of the "Islamic state" reside and move with the 'ummah. Because the very purpose of an "Islamic state" is the fulfillment of divine commands, sovereignty lies with God, and is
exercised by the rulers as a trust."' The historical record of the
Muslim 'ummah is one of fragmentation into multiple political
entities-kaliphates, sultanates, emirates, khanates, empires, and
now, republics. Most theologians, however, remain committed to
the principles of a single 'ummah (Muslim community) and a single Khaliph (or Imam) as essential to an Islamic polity governed
according to the divine law of the sovereign God. One result of
this ensemble of politico/religious beliefs is a tension that has always existed between particularist and universalist loyalties in
Muslim political life. Typically, a Muslim holds two sets of identity: one is immediate, social and spatially particular, and the
other is historical, ideological, and global. Historically, the stability and quality of Muslim life has depended on the extent to
which these two sets of identities could be provisionally reconciled, and the aspiration to full reconciliation has been a preoccupation of politics among Muslim communities.
Among the Muslims of India, hijrat became an issue in the
context of penetration and consolidation of colonial rule over India. The Muslim elite and ulama,86 having been associated with
the ruling classes of India for many centuries, resented their removal from positions of political and cultural preeminence. This
prompted many Indian Muslims to reaffirm their Islamic identity
through movements of religious revival.8 7 This move towards
85 This construction is incorporated into the constitutional designs of many Muslim-majority states. For example, the constitution of Pakistan proclaims: "Whereas
sovereignty over the entire Universe belongs to Almighty Allah alone, and the authority to be exercised by the people of Pakistan within the limits prescribed by Him
is a sacred trust." PAK. CONST. preamble.
86 'Ulama is the plural of 'alim, according to a scholar of Islamic theology and
jurisprudence. For a study of the 'ulama of India during colonial rule see BARBARA
DALY METCALF, ISLAMIC REVIVAL IN BRITISH INDIA: DEOBAND, 1860-1900 (1982).
87 See Mushirul Hasan, Resistance and Acquiescence in North India: Muslim Responses to the West, in INDIA'S COLONIAL ENCOUNTER: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF
ERIC STOKES 39 (Mushirul Hasan & Narayani Gupta eds., 1993).
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religious revival produced a precursor to the Hijrat Movement in
a movement that combined migration with an effort of jihad8" in
Northwestern India in the early nineteenth century. The conceptual framework for this combination was provided by the classical distinction in Muslim political thought between the
"imperfect state" (madinat al-naqisa) and the "ideal state"
(madinat al-tamma).8 9 The consolidation of colonial rule furnished the context in which some ulama issued a fatwa90 in the
early nineteenth century that declared colonial India a dar ulharb due to the progressive interference of the colonizers with
the inherited tradition and practice of Islamic law. 9 These
ulama encouraged Muslims to migrate to other lands under Muslim rule. One theologian, Saiyid Ahmad of Rai Bareilly, went a
step further and stressed the need to combine relocation with jihad in order to forceably turn dar al-harb into a dar al-Islam.92
Under his leadership, in 1826 a few thousand Muslims from
north-central India undertook a circuitous journey of nearly
three thousand miles through Rajputana, Sindh, Baluchistan, and
Afghanistan and established their base at the bordering region of
Punjab and Afghanistan. As a first step to roll back British colonial rule, the mujahidin engaged the Sikh rulers of Punjab. After
initial success, in 1827 Saiyid Ahmad and his followers created an
embryonic "Islamic" state in the area. The experiment proved
88 While the word literally means "struggle," Muslims have historically interpreted it as "holy war." For articulations of the doctrine during the colonial encounter, see RUDOLPH PETERS, ISLAM AND COLONIALISM: THE DOCTRINE OF JIHAD IN
MODERN HISTORY (1979).
89 Aziz AHMAD,

STUDIES IN ISLAMIC CULTURE

IN THE INDIAN ENVIRONMENT

213 (1964).
90 Fatwa should be understood as a "nonbinding advisory opinion to an individual
questioner ... [given by a] jurisconsult." Muhammad Khalid Masud et al., Muftis,
Fatwas and Islamic Legal Interpretation, in ISLAMIC LEGAL INTERPRETATION: MUFTIS AND THEIR FATWAS 3 (Muhammad Khalid Masud et al. eds., 1996).
91 Until 1790, penal justice in Bengal continued to be dispensed according to the
shari'a norms as revived and consolidated under the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb.
In a 1772 regulation, the colonial authorities provided that "in all suits regarding
inheritance, succession, marriage and caste and other usages and institutions, the law
of the Quran with respect to Muhammadans ... shall be invariably adhered to." P.
HARDY, THE MUSLIMS OF BRITISH INDIA 51 (1972). But by the last decade of the

eighteenth century, the colonial authority, by legislation, began to substitute their
own rules of evidence, definitions of offenses, and penalties for those of the shari'a.
See Michael R. Anderson, Islamic Law and the Colonial Encounter in British India,
in INSTITUTIONS AND IDEOLOGIES 165 (David Arnold & Peter Robb eds., 1993); J.
DUNCAN M. DERRE-rT, RELIGION, LAW, AND THE STATE IN INDIA (1968); MAHABIR
PRASHAD JAIN, OUTLINES OF INDIAN LEGAL HISTORY (4th ed. 1981).
92 Aziz AHMAD, supra note 89, at 214-16.
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short-lived, however; jealousies of local communities and the military force of Sikhs combined to end the experiment in 1831,
when Saiyid Ahmad and six hundred of his followers were killed
in a battle. Some bands of mujahidin survived, joined the 185758 anti-colonial uprising, and were ruthlessly crushed by the British.9 3 In recognition of the power of the ulama to mold Muslim
popular opinion, Viceroy Lord Mayo induced a group of ulama
to issue a fatwa in 1870 declaring British India to be a dar alIslam 94

The specific conjuncture for the Hijrat Movement was provided by a combination of developments within and outside India during the First World War. Internally, this was a phase of
Hindu-Muslim rapprochement based on a joint posture toward
achievement of "self-rule" within the framework of Empire, 95
and a gradual but reluctant accommodation of Indian demands
by the British so as not to jeopardize Indian cooperation in the
war effort. 96 This atmosphere of relative cooperation was
marred by the adoption in March 1919 of the "Rowlatt Act,"
whereby many war-time restrictions on civil rights were made
permanent through a system of special courts and detention without trial.9 7 The Indian response, led by Gandhi, consisted of a
non-violent mass protest movement. The protest was cancelled
suddenly following the infamous massacre of hundreds of protesters by Colonial authorities at Amritsar in April 1919.98 In May
93 AZIZ AHMAD, supra note

89, at 215-16.

13-14 n.5 (1968). Some
evidence exists that decedents of surviving mujahidin remained active in anti-colonial armed struggle well into the 1930s. See Lal Baha, The Activities of the
94 ANIL SEAL, THE EMERGENCE OF INDIAN NATIONALISM

Mujahidin 1900-1936, 18 ISLAMIC STUD. 97 (1979).

95 The high-water mark of this rapprochement was the joint declaration of the
Indian National Congress and the All India Muslim League regarding the desired
constitutional changes conducive to increasing self-governance by Indians. For a
complete list of the demands, see S.M. BURKE & SALIM AL-DIN QURAISHI, THE
BRITISH RAJ IN INDIA: AN HISTORICAL REVIEW

162-63 (1995).

96 The initial British response, enunciated by the Secretary of State Edwin
Montagu in August 1917, while assuring "increasing association of Indians in every
branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions," insisted that India would remain part of the British Empire and that the
British government "must be the judges of the time and measure of each advance."
Id. at 167. This was followed by the Montagu-Chelmsford Report, a report by a
commission for constitutional reform issued in July 1918. A new bill based on the
recommendations of the Report was adopted in December 1919. Id. at 167-73.
97 For a detailed account of the "Rowlatt Act" and its aftermath, see SUMIT
SARKAR, MODERN INDIA 1885-1947, at 187-95 (1983).
98 See RUPERT FURNEAUX, MASSACRE AT AMRITSAR (1963).
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1920, the Hunter Committee, which was established to investigate the disturbances following the adoption of the Rowlatt Act
and the Amritsar massacre, published its report. The committee
split along national lines, with the five British members submitting a Majority Report and the three Indians a Minority Report.
The Majority Report, which was adopted by the British government, exonerated the officer responsible for the massacre. The
Majority Report's release spelled the end of the phase of nationalist dialogue with colonial authorities, triggered a mass non-cooperation movement, and helped the nationalist movement
develop a broad base.
Events far from India also contributed directly to the content
of the Hijrat Movement. During World War I, many Indian
Muslims were concerned about the fate of the Turkish Sultan.
By a curious mix of temporal realities and spiritual beliefs, many
Muslims of India considered the Sultan, in his capacity as the
Khaliph, the symbolic head of the universal Muslim 'ummah.9
Here was a case of fractured sovereignties and ambivalent identities whereby many Indian Muslims concurrently acknowledged
the temporal and territorial sovereignty of the British colonial
rule and the spiritual, extra-territorial sovereignty symbolized by
the Khaliph. To articulate these concerns, a "Khilafat Committee" was formed in 1919 by some Muslim clerics with the support
of Gandhi, and it presented its demands to the participants of the
Paris Peace Conference in March 1920. They demanded that the
Turkish Sultan, as the Khaliph of the Muslims, retain control
over the Muslim sacred places and that the Arabian peninsula
remain under Muslim sovereignty. Gandhi had displayed his
sympathy for the cause of Turkey as early as 1918, when he wrote
to the Viceroy joining the cause of Turkey with India's own cause
of self-rule.1"' Later, he encouraged all potential parties in India
99 Support for the Khaliph was by no means universal among Indian Muslims.
Many Muslim leaders were skeptical of the viability and even the desirability of
preservation of the institution of Khilafat. For example, Mohammad Iqbal, a leading Indian Muslim scholar and political leader, took the position that "[t]he republican form of government is not only thoroughly consistent with the spirit of Islam,
but has also become a necessity in view of the new forces that are set free in the
world of Islam."
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100 Ghandi wrote that "[i]n the most scrupulous regard for the rights of those
(Mohammedan) States and for the Muslim sentiment as to their places of worship,
and your just and timely treatment of India's claim to Home Rule, lies the safety of
the Empire." BURKE, supra note 95, at 216.
THOUGHT IN ISLAM 157
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to adopt a joint position regarding the pace of self-governance
and the question of Khilafat. Publication of the terms of the
Treaty of Sevres in May 1920, which fragmented the Ottoman
Empire, gave the Khilafat Movement a sense of urgency.'' In
response to the Treaty of Sevres and the Hunter Committee Report, an All-Parties Conference met under the auspices of the
Khilafat Committee and, on June 2, 1920, decided to launch a
non-cooperation movement. The cause of Indian self-governance and that of Khilafat were joined, and on August 1, 1920, the
Khilafat Committee under the leadership10 2of Gandhi formally
launched the non-cooperation movement.
For some Indian Muslims the question arose whether, in the
circumstances where their colonial rulers were endangering the
Khilafat, they should leave the "dar-al-harb" of British India and
go to some other land under Muslim rule. The first to express
their views on the subject were the two main leaders of the Khilafat Committee, Shawkat Ali and Muhammad Ali, who wrote in
a memorandum to the Viceroy in April 1919:
When a land is not safe for Islam a Muslim has only two alternatives, Jehad or Hijrat. That is to say, he must either make
use of every force God has given him for the liberation of the
land and the ensurement of perfect freedom for the practice
and preaching of Islam, or he must migrate to some other and
freer land with a view to return[ing] to it when it is once more
safe for Islam.... In view of our weak condition, migration is
the only alternative for us ....

This step, which we shall now

have to consider with all the seriousness that its very nature
of
demands, will be perhaps the most decisive in the history
10 3
our community since the Hijrat of our Holy Prophet.
To put their plan into action, proponents of hijrat needed an
authoritative pronouncement by a leading juris consult. Like lay
Muslims, the ulama were deeply divided on the question and a

101 Under the terms of the treaty, the Turkish Sultan's empire was dismantled.
The Arab region that contained the holy cities of Muslim lands became an independent state; under the Mandate system of the League of Nations Syria became
a mandate of France, and Mesopotamia and Palestine mandates of Britain. See
PAUL C. HELMREICH, FROM PARIS TO SPEVRES: THE PARTITION OF THE OT7OMAN
EMPIRE AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE OF 1919-1920, at 314-37 (1974).
102 A resolution of the Congress adopted in September 1920 at the urging of Gan-

dhi, though strongly opposed by other leaders, listed the grievances and the methods
of non-cooperation. For the text, see BURKE, supra note 95, at 222-23.
103 Qureshi, supra note 80, at 43.
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public controversy among them ensued.' 4 The pro-hijrat camp
argued that ever since the British occupied India, it had ceased to
be dar al-Islam, because the British had gradually replaced the
shari'a with their own legal system. This interference with Islamic law had turned India into dar al-harb and, therefore, hijrat
had become a religious duty. A noted religious leader and
scholar, Abul-Kalam Azad, supplied the much-needed fatwa.
Azad took the position that, under the circumstances, hijrat had
become an important part of the political duties of Indian Muslims, including fealty to the Khaliph, rallying to his call, submission to his authority, and jihad, or religious war. Azad declared
that under religious doctrine, there was no alternative to hijrat
for the Indian Muslims; whereas before the World War hijrat was
commendable, it had now become mandatory. Azad acknowledged that it was neither possible nor desirable for the entire
Muslim population in British India to migrate; those staying behind were advised to continue the struggle for the Khilafat and
participate in the non-cooperation movement. He further recommended that the exodus should be planned and organized.
Further incitement to hijrat came from the Amir of Afghanistan, who, since the Third Anglo-Afghan War of 1919, had capitalized on the inflamed emotions of Indian Muslims in order to
resist British pressure and project himself as the guardian of the
Muslims of Northern India and Central Asia. In a speech in
Kabul in early 1920, the Amir welcomed all those who intended
to migrate. The foreign minister of Afghanistan, who was in India for negotiations with British authorities, subsequently addressed Muslim gatherings and assured them of Afghan support
for the Khilafat and help for those who felt compelled to leave
India.
Armed with the pro-hijratfatwa and emboldened by Afghan
overtures, an active hijrat campaign began in earnest. In April
1920, the Khilafat Workers' Conference in Delhi formally proclaimed the goal of hijrat to Afghanistan." °5 A central hijrat office was established at Delhi, with branches throughout the
country. Corps of volunteers were recruited to assist. Efforts
were made to familiarize the masses with the religious aspects of
hijrat; propaganda leaflets were widely distributed and preachers
104

The controversy is captured well in Qureshi, supra note 80, at 41, and
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105 Qureshi, supra note 80, at 46.
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were appointed to spread the campaign. A significant part in the
mobilization campaign was played by the spread of rumors regarding the cities of Mecca and Medina in Arabia, home to holy
shrines of the Muslims. These rumors ranged from the bombardment of the two cities to their occupation, complete destruction,
and desecration. Another important part of the campaign was
attractive accounts of life in Afghanistan. The people were told
of the great receptions awaiting them. The Amir had promised
them tracts of fertile land and that they would be cared for by
their Afghan co-religionists.
Prospective migrants from the United Provinces, Sindh, and
the Punjab, but predominantly from North-West Frontier Province, began assembling in Peshawar, the main city at the gateway
to the Khyber Pass. An organized exodus began on May 18,
1920, with the first group crossing the border into Afghanistan.
In many cases whole families, and in some cases whole villages,
had embarked on hijrat. Many quickly sold their possessions or
simply abandoned them. 106 By August 1920, an estimated
100,000 people had crossed over, an estimate that does not include those who migrated without the assistance of the hijrat
committees and those who made their way through routes other
than the Khyber. At the height of this movement, about eight
thousand persons per week crossed over into Afghanistan. Surprised by the numbers and lacking resources to provide for the
migrants, Afghan authorities decided to stop further migration.
In late August 1920, the Afghan government issued a proclamation that only after absorption of the previous migrants would
any new immigrants be allowed into Afghanistan. Recently improved relations with the British and the economic cost of accommodating the migrants accounted for the Afghan action. As
a result of the Afghan measure the hijrat from India stopped.
Soon the migrants started to return to India, disillusioned by the
treatment they had received in Afghanistan. While most of those

106 The Deputy-Commissioner of Peshawar reported:

[Mien immediately put aside all other thoughts, but that of leaving the district for Afghanistan. They sold [all their] property without the least
thought for the future .

. .

. It thus happened that land, plough cattle,

houses, foodstuffs, and all household belongings were sold at ridiculously
low prices, and in many cases simply abandoned.
Baha, supra note 80, at 234. Speculators bought all of the property at extremely low
prices. Id. at 235.
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who migrated came back, many did settle in Afghanistan and
some proceeded further to Central Asia, Russia, and Turkey.
The reaction of colonial authorities to hijrat was ambivalent.
Their anxiety concerned two possible results of the Hijrat Movement: collapse of the provincial state apparatus due to resignation of native public servants and the spread of violence in a
region where most men were traditionally armed. A few native
public servants did resign, and there were a few instances of a
breakdown in law and order. However, the colonial provincial
government of the North-West Frontier Province followed a policy of strict noninterference with the massive movement of peo10 7
ple for fear of inciting violence against colonial authorities.
After the end of hijrat, the provincial government created special
judicial procedures to help resettle the returnees, and resignations tendered by public servants were deemed withdrawn.
The hijrat proved to be a many-sided event. Existing assessments of the movement have fallen considerably short of explaining the complexity of the phenomenon. The main emphasis of
the conventional evaluation of the movement has been on the
religious aspect. 1 8 Not much evidence exists that evoking the
religious cause of hijrat was sufficient to send people running to
Afghanistan. Other, more emotive elements or incidents combined to generate a perception among the Muslims of northwestern India that Islam and their way of life were threatened.
Apparently, rumors played the most crucial role. The alleged
bombing and occupation of the holy places in Arabia by the Brit107 When asked by the central government to take drastic action against the more
violent agitators, the Provincial Chief-Commissioner replied:
[W]hatever the gallant arm-chair militarist of Simla may say or think, I can
solemnly assure you that in the present circumstances the first volley fired
in Peshawar city will reverberate through Central Asia, and the trouble will
not stop there.
Id. at 238.
108 The official British annual report on India in 1920 stated that "the Hijrat, or
migration from one country to another for religious reasons has played a considerable part in Muslim history; but its revival in the present year of grace presented to
the student of politics a phenomenon at once remarkable and tragic." REETZ, supra
note 80, at 76. Baha stresses that "[t]he Muslim religio-political leadership, being
unaware of the practical realities, exploited the religious feelings of the Muslims to
such an extent that they awakened forces which they could not control; a sad commentary on their leadership." Baha, supra note 80, at 240. Hasan calls the hijrat "a

spontaneous outburst of religious fervor." Mushirul Hasan, Introduction-The Khilafat Movement: A Reappraisal,in COMMUNAL AND PAN-ISLAMIC TRENDS IN COLONIAL INDIA

1 (Mushirul Hasan ed., 1985).
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ish was a turning point. The mobilization also drew much
strength from a promise of a better life, which may be called the
movement's millenarian aspect. The rural poor wanted to escape
the miseries of their daily plight and move to the "promised
land." These hopes crept into people's perceptions intuitively
rather than being propogated deliberately. Even keeping in view
the modest promises that the Afghans made to the emigrants in
the beginning, these hopes were by and large illusory, for they far
exceeded Afghan commitments. These hopes resulted from the
element of social protest in the movement. Partly directed
against the rapidly encroaching colonial order, hijrat appears
close to Eric Hobsbawm's conception of archaic social and political protest, 10 9 James Scott's conception of the moral economy of
the peasant, 110 and Michael Adas' notion of avoidance protest
that belong to the archaic stage of rural resistance. 1 As Hobsbawm, Scott, and Ada have repeatedly emphasized, archaic protest has much to do with the need to deal with a new situation
marked by the intrusion of a new order, that is, the capitalist
mode of production into the daily lives of the people. Where
legitimate political participation is absent, as was the case in
northwestern India in 1920 under colonial rule, group avoidance
protest is one of the few available political means for resisting a
new order. Participation in the hijrat also bore some traces of
pre-modern kinship politics. Emigrants joined the hijrat movement often on the advice of their tribal elders or preachers,
which represented a common variation of kinship politics in the
region.
109 ERIC JOHN HOBSBAWM, PRIMITIVE REBELS (3rd ed. 1971).
110 JAMES C. Sco-r, THE MORAL ECONOMY OF THE PEASANT: REBELLION AND
SUBSISTENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (1976).

111 Michael Adas, From Avoidance to Confrontation: Peasant Protest in
Precolonialand Colonial Southeast Asia, 23 COMP. STUD. IN SoC'Y & HIS. 217
(1981); Michael Adas, From Footdraggingto Flight: The Evasive History of Peasant
Avoidance Protest in South and Southeast Asia, 13 J. OF PEASANT STUD. 64 (1986).

Of particular relevance here are the four forms of "exit protest" identified by Adas:
(1) the transfer of allegiance from one landlord/ruler to another; (2) flight en masse
to areas beyond the state's control; (3) the abandonment of routine agrarian tasks in
favor of joining a sectarian community; and (4) the rejection of the peasant status
altogether. Exit protest is a very amorphous group activity where various shades
and combinations exist. While the hijrat would not fit neatly into any of these categories, Adas' analysis of sectarian exit protest comes closest to what the hijrat represented. He notes that the imposition of "infidel" rule and social and economic
dislocation resulted in a marked increase in sectarian movements, whose adherents
intended to register their dissent through passive withdrawal. Id. at 76-77.
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The hijrat movement stands in the line of three traditions or
larger strands of mass mobilization efforts that had in common
the desire to wrench control of public life in India from the British. The three traditions could be distinguished by the extent and
thrust of the control at which they aimed. First, hijrat continued
the line of religious movements, whether Islamic or of other religious affiliations in India, that gained prominence in the nineteenth century and symbolized the desire to regain cultural
control, including apparently such diverse objects as symbols,
language, identity, and religion, in the face of the ascendance of
British "Christian" rule over India. Second, hijrat also clearly
belonged to the Khilafat and civil disobedience movements of
1920-23. While both of these reached primarily for national
political control, they aimed at different kinds of hegemony. The
Khilafat Movement sought hegemony for the Indian Muslim
elite and the ulama in particular, while the champions of civil
disobedience were striving for hegemony over the whole of India
for cross-cultural elites, basically through a secular ideology with
important infusions of religious Hindu nationalism. Finally,
hijrat, by way of its limited northwestern regional base, was a
component of the formation of local politics and regional political mobilization, with a strong ethnic element emphasizing
either a common northwest Indian Muslim identity or the preponderance of Pathan influence in the affair. In this capacity the
movement reached for regional control over the northwest, or,
more narrowly, over Pathan areas of British India. There was a
clearly marked and highly localized idiom of political discourse
that mainly fed on Islamic symbolism. There was also, at one
time or the other, a wide range of attitudes among national political and Islamic leaders ranging from helplessness to tolerance to
cautious approval, leaving a wide margin of interpretation to local activists who used it according to their understanding of the
situation and to their local objectives of control and resistance.
Thus, hijrat appears in various perspectives sometimes small and
insignificant, even futile and foolish, and occasionally grand
though desperate and rash.
While the Hijrat Movement can be comprehended only within
the larger context of India's encounter with colonial rule, its two
exceptional aspects need to be highlighted: first, it was relatively
immune from both the exchange and sovereignty impulses of the
modern world system; and second, its notions of sovereignty, na-
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tionhood, and state constituted subjectivities not available for colonial subjugation. The global division of labor borne by colonial
rule had very little, if anything, to do with hijrat. The center of
gravity of the movement was in extreme northwestern India, an
area where British colonial rule reached late and remained tenuous. More significantly, hijrat constituted a refutation of the territorial grounding of modern Eurocentric notions of nation, state,
and sovereignty. The migrants considered themselves part of the
universal community of the Muslim 'ummah, and the only state
worthy of their fidelity was one organized to facilitate commands
of a transcendental, divine sovereign. The Hijrat Movement was
an assertion that political borders were not territorial, but rather
moral ones that individuals and collectivities carry with them.
Ironically, hijrat also brought into sharp relief one specific terrain of conflict between exchange and sovereignty impulses of
the modern world system, namely, geo-political power projections. The Hijrat Movement unfolded against the backdrop of
the century-old, so-called "great game" of the Central Asian region between Britain and Russia,"' and the distribution of Middle Eastern spoils of World War I among the Allied powers.
While territory is the fundamental currency of geo-politics, hijrat,
in its complete rejection of a territorial demarcation of identity,
asserted a subjectivity beyond the reach of geo-politics. Finally,
hi]rat was a moment of resistance to colonial domination, conducted by the assertion of identities constituted outside the
frameworks of the colonial order; in this maneuver, hijrat refutes
the claim that "resistance is never in a position of exteriority in
relation to power."11' 3
C. Divide and Quit: Migration and PostcolonialPartition
British colonial rule over India ended at midnight on the 14th

of August 1947; in its wake, the two sovereign states of India and
Pakistan emerged. The partition of colonial India occasioned
one of the greatest mass migrations in recorded history. Between
August 1947 and April 1951 some fourteen million people moved
between the two new states. 11 4 About eight million Muslims mi112
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grated from India to the area now designated Pakistan and about
six million non-Muslims migrated from Pakistan to India. The
partition, and the mass migration it triggered, was the result of
two broad trends characteristic of colonialism in general and of
India's colonial encounter in particular: (1) the classic colonial
governance technique of "divide and rule," when practiced in the
demographic complexity of India, culminated in "divide and
quit,"11 and (2) the adoption by nationalist elites of modern
Eurocentric concepts of the ideal "nation-state" and its indivisible sovereignty, which could be reconciled with the heterogeneity of India only by fracturing it.
The regional, cultural, linguistic, religious, and political heterogeneity of pre-colonial India furnished a fertile ground for the
classic colonial governance strategy of "divide and rule." ' 6 Operational dualities were quickly developed and institutionalized
under colonial rule. The most salient political divisions in India
created and consolidated by the British were: (1) an administrative division between areas directly governed by the colonial regime and the indirectly governed princely states; (2) the division
between uniform colonial laws for the public sphere and religionbased customary laws for the private sphere; and (3) the construction and institutionalization of political identities based on
diverse religious affiliations. It was this last division, and the
communal identities it posited, that ultimately led to partition.
Communalism is the belief that a group of people, who have one
ascriptive identity in common, such as religion or language, also
share common interests in other fields of collective life. By placing emphasis on one shared cultural attribute, an earnest attempt
is made to overcome a disturbing internal diversity by appealing
to a higher but largely imagined unity. That imagined unity may
refer to a nation, but may also refer to a religious or linguistic
community. A collective communal identity is not a given priO.H.K. SPATE, INDIA AND PAKISTAN: A GENERAL AND REGIONAL GEOGRAPHY
119 (1954) (estimating seventeen million).
115 I adopt the phrase from the title of a book about partition authored by a senior

member of the colonial administration.
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(1961).
116 Colonial officials were quite vocal that they would "uphold in full force the
(for us fortunate) separation which exists between the different religions and races,
not to endeavour to amalgamate them. Divide et impera should be the principle of
Indian government." R. PALME Durr, INDIA TODAY 423 (1949) (quoting Lieutenant-Colonel Coke, Commandant of Moradabad). See also B.B. MISRA, THE UNIFICATION AND DIVISION OF INDIA

(1990).
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mordial social fact, even though it is often thought useful to seek
the sanction of history. The activation of distinctive boundaries
between social groups takes place in a process of social identification, a dialectic of inclusion and exclusion. In mass politics,
communities emerge in a dynamic of group solidarities when
political actors mobilize one or another vector of a matrix of potential structures of identification. Emergence of communalism
means, then, that one particular set of social boundaries is deliberately activated and imbued with a new meaning at the cost of
other possible identities.
Religion is one possible source of communal identity. The decision of the colonial government of India to introduce religion
as the fundamental category for administrative and electoral classification infused a particular political meaning into concepts like
Hindu and Muslim, and privileged religious aspects of identity at
the expense of other aspects, such as race, class, language, or location. These classifications and constructions of identities were
the fruits of colonial projects of knowledge geared towards making the colony susceptible to certain kinds of governance,
projects that specialized "in the particularizing and dividing of
things Oriental into manageable parts."1'17 One of the most lasting and fundamental of the orientalist productions of knowledge
with respect to India as an object of sociological inquiry was to
essentialize the social categories "Hindu" and "Muslim," and
posit them in a mutually irreconcilable relationship of otherness. 1 18 These constructions of mutually exclusive religious iden117 SAID, ORIENTALISM,

supra note 13, at 72. See also David Ludden, Orientalist

Empiricism: Transformations of Colonial Knowledge, in

ORIENTALISM AND THE

250 (Carol A. Breckenridge & Peter van der Veer eds., 1993).
118 1adopt here Said's characterization of Western knowledge about the Orient in
the post-Enlightenment period, which he argues was "a systematic discipline by
which European culture was able to manage-and even produce-the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively." SAID,
ORIENTALISM, supra note 13, at 3. Said terms this project "orientalism," which he
describes as:
[A]n elaboration not only of a basic geographical distinction (the world is
made up of two unequal halves, Orient and Occident) but also of a whole
series of 'interests' which ... it not only creates but also maintains; it is,
rather than expresses, a certain will or intention to understand, in some
cases to control, manipulate, even to incorporate, what is a manifestly different (or alternative and novel) world.
Id. at 12. See also SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM, supra note 13. For a critique
of Said's theses, see AIJAZ AHMAD, IN THEORY: CLASSES, NATIONS, LITERATURES
159-219 (1992). On Orientalist knowledge production about India and its relationPOSTCOLONIAL PREDICAMENT: PERSPECTIVES ON SOUTH ASIA
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tities were then institutionalized in sites of political
representation.
The primary instrument used by colonial powers in India to
demarcate political identities along religious communal lines was
the system of the so-called "separate electorate" which provided

for reserved seats in legislative bodies for religious minorities,
which, in turn, were to be filled by elections within the respective
minority. The system was introduced in 1909 for Muslims and in
1919 extended to other religious minorities.1 1 9 The separate electorate scheme illustrated the resolve of the colonial powers to
use the "'existence side by side of these hostile creeds [as] one of
the strong points in our political position in India."" 2 By setting

up the "electoral framework for two party-systems-not for a
two-party system,"' 121 this system transformed Hindu and Muslim
religious affiliations into political identities and positioned them

antagonistically. 122
ship with colonial power relations, see RONALD B. INDEN, IMAGINING INDIA (1990);
Ronald Inden, Orientalist Constructions of India, 20 MODERN ASIAN STUDIES 401
(1986). On the relationship between Orientalist colonial projects of knowledge and
constructions of "Hindu" and "Muslim" identities in India, see Peter van der Veer,
The Foreign Hand: Orientalist Discourse in Sociology and Communalism, in ORIENTALISM AND THE POSTCOLONIAL PREDICAMENT: PERSPECTIVES ON SOUTH ASIA 23
(Carol A.

Breckenridge

& Peter van der Veer eds., 1993); Arjun Appadurai,

Number in the Colonial Imagination, in ORIENTALISM AND THE POSTCOLONIAL
PREDICAMENT: PERSPECTIVES ON SOUTH ASIA 314 (Carol A. Breckenridge & Peter
van der Veer eds., 1993); Rosane Rocher, British Orientalism in the Eighteenth Century: The Dialectics of Knowledge and Government, in ORIENTALISM AND THE
POSTCOLONIAL PREDICAMENT: PERSPECTIVES ON SOUTH ASIA 215 (Carol A.

Breck-

enridge & Peter van der Veer eds., 1993).
119 For details of the context and operation of the separate electorate system see
Dick Kooiman, Separate Electorates: Separate Identities? Experiencesfrom Colonial
India, in CHANGING IDENTITIES: THE TRANSFORMATION OF ASIAN AND AFRICAN

SOCIETIES UNDER COLONIALISM 255 (Joachim Heidrich ed., 1994). See also Peter
van der Veer, The Foreign Hand, supra note 118, at 24.
120 Du-r-r, supra note 116, at 423 (quoting Sir John Strachey).
121 Myron Weiner, India, in COMPETITIVE ELECTIONS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 37, 41 (Myron Weiner & Ergun Ozbudun eds., 1987).
122 Some have traced the institutionalization of religious identities, particularly of
the Indian Muslims, to the British view of representation as deployed in the Indian
context. While colonial powers were interested in securing "a 'representative' assembly that could accurately reflect the society of which it was a part," being an
Indian was not adequate since the very idea "was subject to question in so diverse a
society. What was essential was to demonstrate a given connection between representative and represented that rested upon a set of shared social, cultural, religious
or racial affinities."
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While ascription of religion-based identities may have suited

colonial designs well, as the end of colonial rule became imminent, this created an unprecedented political problem for India's
nationalist elites. The problem was the incompatibility between
the assumptions and implications of a separate electorate and the
imperatives of the basic operating principle of colonial India, i.e.,
indivisible sovereignty. What made British colonial rule unique
in Indian history was its discursive and institutional designs that
constituted the heterogeneity of India into a centralized political
unity, based on the construct of a singular and indivisible sovereignty. 1 23 The project of constituting a political India in conformity with geographical India issued directly from colonial

requirements, both strategic and economic. In contrast with the
loosely woven web of suzerainty claimed by pre-colonial Indian
empires, the British established an essentially unitary state structure in colonial India.
The nationalist elites in colonial India, both Hindu and Muslim, were the products not only of the general milieu of the colonial encounter, but had also developed their identities and world
views in close proximity to the colonial state apparatuses and, as
' 124
such, formed part of what Hamza Alavi terms the "salariat.
COMMUNAL POLITICS IN INDIA (1994); DAVID PAGE, PRELUDE TO PARTITION: THE
INDIAN MUSLIMS AND THE IMPERIAL SYSTEM OF CONTROL 1920-1932 (1982); GYANENDRA PANDEY, THE CONSTRUCTION OF COMMUNALISM IN COLONIAL NORTH

INDIA (1990); Dilip Simeon, Communalism in Modern India: A Theoretical Examination, 4 SOCIAL SCIENCE PROBINGS 67 (1987); Romila Thapar, Imagined Religious
Communities? Ancient History and the Modern Search for a Hindu Identity, 23
MODERN ASIAN STUDIES 209 (1989).
123

See
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A COMPARATIVE AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 9-22 (1995).
124 Hamza Alavi, Formationof the Social Structure of South Asia under the Impact
of Colonialism, in
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ASIA 5

(Hamza Alavi & John Harriss eds., 1989); Hamza Alavi, Pakistan and Islam: Ethnicity and Ideology, in STATE AND IDEOLOGY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND PAKISTAN 6873 (Fred Halliday & Hamza Alavi eds., 1988). Alavi's argument is that one class has
been central to the development of nationalism and identity politics in South Asia.
This is a section of the urban middle class, those who sought formal educational
qualifications required to entitle them to colonial government jobs at various levels,
and who either occupied or aspired to such jobs. Alavi has termed this class the
"salariat." This class has a particular salience in colonized societies with a predominantly agrarian production base where the colonial state apparatus has a dominating
presence in the urban society and is its principal employer. Associated with the
"salariat" are urban professionals, as well as the intelligentsia, writers, poets, teachers, and journalists who share the life experiences and many of the aspirations of the
"salariat." It is from amongst these groups that an articulate component of the political leadership is drawn. The political role of the salariat is quite ambivalent. As
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Having internalized key aspects and assumptions of European
public culture125 that furnished the bases of their elite status, the
nationalist elites were well versed in the modern imperatives in-

separably interlinking the nation, the state, and political sovereignty. They were thus alert to the classic nationalist project in
the colonies that eligibility for self-determination and independence required an articulation of a "nation" that would inherit

the colonial state apparatus and exercise its sovereignty as an independent state.
The Indian National Congress took the position that all inhabitants of India, regardless of religious and cultural differences,
constituted a single nation and were entitled to a sovereign, unified state."2 6 This scheme did not leave much room for the Musindividuals it is important for them to demonstrate their loyalty to the colonial regime so that they might be trusted with jobs and secure promotions. As a class, the
nationalist movement, with its slogan of "Indianization" of the civil services, promoted their interest. In the late nineteenth century it was the professionals and the
"salariat" who initiated and backed the nationalist movement which sought a greater
measure of "self-government" within the British Empire. Later, when the nationalist movement began to get radicalized and to develop a mass base, this class constituted the moderate nationalists. On the nationalist movement in colonial India and
its leadership, see BIPAN CHANDRA, NATIONALISM AND COLONIALISM IN MODERN
INDIA (1979) and ANIL SEAL, THE EMERGENCE OF INDIAN NATIONALISM: COMPETITION AND COLLABORATION IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1968).
125 In this sense, the nationalist elite was the product of the cultural project of
colonialism, which aimed, in the words of Macaulay, to create "a class who may be
interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons Indian
in blood and colour, but English in tastes, in opinions, in morals and in intellect."
Thomas Babington Macaulay, Minute on Indian Education, in SELECTED WRITINGS
249 (John Clive ed., 1972). As Chatterjee asserts, while Indian nationalist thought
set out "to assert its freedom from European domination [in] the very conception of
its project, it remain[ed] a prisoner of the prevalent European intellectual fashion."

A DEDISCOURSE? 10 (1993). According to Chatterjee:
If nationalists in the rest of the world have to choose their imagined community from certain 'modular' forms already made available to them by
Europe and the Americas, what do they have left to imagine? History, it
would seem, has decreed that we, in the post-colonial world, shall only be
perpetual consumers of modernity. Europe and the Americas, the only
true subjects of history, have thought out on our behalf not only the script
of colonial enlightenment and exploitation, but also that our anti-colonial
resistance and post-colonial misery. Even our imaginations must remain
forever colonised.
Partha Chatterjee, Whose Imagined Community?, 20 MILLENNIUM 521 (1991). See
also ASHIS NANDY, THE INTIMATE ENEMY: LOSS AND RECOVERY OF SELF UNDER
COLONIALISM (1983); Homi Bhabha, Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse, 28 OCTOBER 125 (1984).
PARTHA CHATTERJEE, NATIONALIST THOUGHT AND THE COLONIAL WORLD:
RIVATIVE
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lim elites, whose security had been built upon communal

identities institutionalized through the system of a separate electorate. If claims upon the state required the existence of a "nation," one could be imagined. The All India Muslim League
took the religious-communal political identity a step further and
advanced the so-called "two-nation theory."' 2 7 Adopting the co-

lonial construction of religion as the primary determinant of
political identity, this theory posited that there were two nations
in India: Hindus and Muslims. Both, therefore, as a matter of
realizing self-determination, had a right to distinct, sovereign
states, with the Muslim state to be carved out of the Muslim majority areas of northwest and northeast India. The "two-nation

theory," however, was not necessarily a blue-print for partition.
Instead, it formed part of a strategy to win a larger share of
power for the Muslims at the all-India level on the basis of their
128
combined numerical majorities in the northwest and northeast.
According to this logic, the two-nation theory provided the Muslim League with political leverage necessary to negotiate constitutional safeguards for Muslim minorities throughout India in
exchange for those to be conferred upon the large non-Muslim
129
minorities in the Muslim majority areas.
This position depended upon an increasingly problematic assumption of the political viability of sovereignty shared between
127 See KHALID B. SAREED, PAKISTAN: THE FORMATIVE PHASE 1857-1948, at

102-33 (2d ed. 1968).
128 This position is quite convincingly argued by AVESHA JALAL, THE SOLE
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(1985).
129 In 1940, some 100 million Muslims lived in British India, slightly more than
one-fourth of the total population. Religion was the only thing these people shared;
otherwise, there were vast differences of language, culture, social, and economic
backgrounds. Within this Muslim population there existed at least three distinct
groupings: one in the northwest, the second in the northeast, and the third in the
north-central regions of the country. The first two groups constituted clear majorities in their areas: of a total population of sixty million in the northwest, sixty percent professed Islam; of the ninety million in the northeast, some fifty-five percent
were Muslims. In the north-central provinces, however, Muslims were a minority,
about twenty percent of the total population. Robust federalism with protections
for the Muslim minority of north-central India was the goal of Muslim League, as is
evidenced by its acceptance in 1946 of the Cabinet Mission Plan, which provided for
a three-tier federal constitutional arrangement covering the whole of India. It was
only after the collapse of this plan that partition became the alternative. See BURKE
& QURAISHI, supra note 95, at 425-450; ANITA INDER SINGH, THE ORIGINS OF THE
PARTITION OF INDIA 1936-1947, at 142-178 (1987); Ayesha Jalal & Anil Seal, Alternatives to Partition:Muslim Politics Between the Wars, 15 MODERN ASIAN STUDIES
415 (1981).
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Hindu-majority and Muslim-majority regions. The singular and
indivisible sovereignty exercised by the colonial state apparatus
over the whole of geographical India precluded accommodation
of a divisible and fractured sovereignty. The very concept of the
modern "nation-state" rested on an assumed commensurability
between the inherent flexibility of an "imagined community" and
the inescapable fixity of territoriality. Modern political discourse
dictated that while a state might be divided, sovereignty was indivisible. The logical solution to the impasse, then, was partition of
India into two sovereign "nation-states." This is where migration
came in: it would reconcile the communal claims of nationhood
with the territorial expression of statehood given the diversity
and heterogeneity of India.
This would not be an organized and peaceful transfer of population, however. Colonialism's last act in India was its partition,
and the way it was handled has been best characterized as "an
ignominious scuttle."13 Even if partition had become an unavoidable solution to the political impasse, three avoidable decisions by the colonial authorities particularly contributed to the
holocaust that followed and triggered mass migrations beyond
the wildest imaginations. The first was to effectuate partition
within ten weeks of the announcement of the plan to partition
India. This was quite obviously an insufficient amount of time to
prepare the different communities of India for an event that
would change their lives forever. The second was to break up
and allocate the colonial apparatuses of the state between the
two new states even before the date of partition. This resulted in
an immediate disruption, bordering on collapse of the civil administration, at a time when a likely breakdown of law and order
should have been anticipated and effectively preempted. The
third was that not only India, but also the two main Muslim-majority provinces of Punjab and Bengal, were partitioned.1 3 1
note 128, at 293.
131 The logic that the Muslim League had pursued in getting the British and ultimately the Congress to agree to the partition of India was turned against it when the
time came to draw the territorial boundary between the two new states. Muslim
majorities existed in both Punjab and Bengal, but not in all districts of these two
populous provinces. Accordingly, these two provinces were also partitioned, with
the exact boundaries demarcated two days after the partition. In spite of this partition, a great number of Muslims remained situated in Indian Punjab and Bengal, and
a great number of Hindus remained in the Pakistani parts of the two provinces. The
case of Punjab was complicated even further by the fact that it was home to another
130 JALAL, supra

large religious group, the Sikhs, who were equally divided between the two parts of
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These factors directly led to the holocaust in Northern India, particularly in Punjab, that cost more than a million lives and triggered the unprecedented mass migration.13 2
Communal riots had disfigured the history of India through
the ages, but the riots had been predominantly local affairs that
erupted for a few days and then died down, leaving the compositions of the populations unchanged. As partition became imminent and as the administrative machinery in Punjab and Bengal
became ineffective, communal riots increased in intensity and
took on the shape of what, today, we might deem ethnic cleansing. When it all ended, about one million lay dead and the terror
and violence succeeded in bringing about a virtually complete
and forcible exchange of population.' 3 3 By March 1948, six million Muslims had migrated to Pakistan and four and a half million Hindus and Sikhs had migrated to India. 13 4 In this tragic
human drama one could:
witness those bewildered streams of people pouring over one
brand-new border into another, hurting as they ran. It was
extravagant, history's wrenching price: farmers, villagers, living in some other world, one day awoke to find they no longer
inhabited familiar homes but that most modern thing, a Muslim or a Hindu nation.' 35
The sections of population that migrated from Muslim-minority
areas to Pakistan included: (1) the political leadership and senior
cadre of the Pakistan movement from north-central India; 1 36 (2)
sections of the Muslim "salariat" from north-central India who
saw better prospects for advancement in the bureaucratic structures of the new state; (3) sections of Muslim capital owners from
north-central India who saw investment opportunities in the new
the province. Craig Baxter, Union or Partition:Some Aspects of Politics in the Punjab, 1936-45, in PAKISTAN: THE LONG VIEW 40 (Lawrence Ziring et. al. eds., 1977).
132 See H.V. HODSON, THE GREAT DIVIDE: BRITAIN-INDIA-PAKISTAN 403-418
(1985). The violence and human tragedy that accompanied partition is best cap-

tured in literature. For a representative selection of this literature, see 1 INDIA PARTITIONED: THE OTHER FACE OF FREEDOM (Mushirul Hasan ed., 1995), and 2 INDIA
PARTITIONED: THE OTHER FACE OF FREEDOM (Mushirul Hasan ed., 1995).
133 See HODSON, supra note 132, at 418.
134 SARKAR, supra note 97, at 434.
135 SARA SULERI, MEATLESS DAYS 116 (1989).
136 Not all of the Muslim political elite left for Pakistan

at partition. Theodore P.
Wright, Jr., The Muslim League in South India Since Independence: A Study in Minority Group Political Strategies, 60 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 579 (1966). Regarding the
Muslim political elite that remained in India see Theodore P. Wright, Jr., Muslim
Legislators in India: Profile of a Minority Elite, 23 J. OF ASIAN STUD. 253 (1964).

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76, 1997]

state, free of competition from more entrenched capital interests
in India; (4) many Muslims who feared social and political vulnerability in their new status as an even smaller minority in the
new India; and (5) targets and victims of post-partition communal violence.
Partition primarily resulted from a combination of colonial designs of governance and modern Eurocentric constructions of nationhood, statehood, and sovereignty, transplanted to South
Asia. Furthermore, while orientalist projects of knowledge production, colonial regimes of governance, and the Eurocentric arsenal of possible frameworks of polities furnished the necessary
context of partition, partition was not some logical, inevitable, or
predetermined result. It was the combination of the necessary
context with unforeseen contingencies and even accidental factors that resulted in the final outcome. Similarly, the relationship
between partition and the subsequent mass migration remains
ambiguous, arbitrary, unpredictable, and autonomous of any
fixed causal relationship. Even if the migration of the political
leadership and the "salariat" was a predictable outcome of partition, these two groups constituted a very small segment of the
migrating population. The largest number migrated as a result of
communal riots and violence. This violence was predictable and
avoidable, as was the mass migration it triggered. Ironically, this
mass migration represented both the triumph and failure of the
colonial project. It was a triumph because it resulted from the
institutionalization of the concept of a sovereign nation-state, a
concept transplanted to India by colonialism. It was a failure because it came about from the collapse of the structures of governance installed by colonial rule. Coming on the eve of world-wide
decolonization, this migration served as a preface to the
problems many postcolonial societies would face as they attempted to negotiate vexing questions of nationhood, statehood
and citizenship within territorial boundaries arbitrarily bequeathed by colonial encounters. We now turn to this problem.
II
POST-MIGRATION IDENTITIES: CONTEXTUAL CONSTRUCTIONS
AND CONTINGENT DEPLOYMENTS

All identities are relational rather than essential and any study
of identities must examine the contextual relationships and
processes that construct these identities. It is the contingency
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and instability of construction that allows varied, even contradictory, political deployments of any particular identity. Migrantidentity is no exception to this rule. The following case study
substantiates this claim by describing identity-formation and
politics of a section of migrants that formed part of the post-partition mass migration discussed above. This is the story of one
section from among the eight million Muslims who migrated to
the new state of Pakistan from the rest of colonial India. During
the last fifty years, the constructions and deployments of identity
of this migrant community went through three distinct, even contradictory, phases in tune with the changes in the positioning of
this community within the power relations in the new state. In
the first phase, this migrant group, comprising about six percent
of the country's population, enjoyed a hegemonic position in the
power bloc and thus dominated the political, economic, and cultural spheres of the society. In the second phase, as it gradually
lost ground to forces seeking democratic governance, redistributive economy, and entrenched federalism, this group embraced
the right-wing politics of religious parties in order to combat its
adversaries. In the current phase, this group has turned to a politics of ethnicity, translated its migrant status into assertions of a
distinct nationality status within Pakistan, and sought corresponding political and constitutional concessions. Symbolically,
a significant part of the last phase is that this group has chosen to
call itself muhajirs (migrants). This term is used in the rest of
this section to distinguish this group from other post-partition
migrants.
The muhajirs belong to the Urdu-speaking Muslim minority
communities of urban areas of north-central India, where they
formed about twenty percent of the population. In the pre-colonial period, the close association of the elites of these communities with the Mughal empire ensured them a privileged social and
cultural status. Consolidation of colonial rule endangered and
threatened to extinguish this elite. Following the failure of their
bloody but ill-organized attempt to regain power in 1857, as colonial governance passed from the British East India Company to
the British government and as Urdu and Persian gave way to
English as the medium of official communication, the ruin of this
erstwhile elite was completed. Over the next fifty years, this elite
reconstituted itself through adoption of modern education to facilitate its incursion into colonial administrative apparatuses.
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Their search for a distinct political voice led them, in 1906, to

form All India Muslim League in order "[t]o protect and advance
'1 3 7
the political rights and interests of the Mussalmans of India.'
Because the political center of gravity of colonial India remained

in north-central urban areas and the primary struggle of the Muslim League was to advance the interests of the Muslim minority
in this region, the leadership of the party remained firmly in the

hands of this group. This leadership remained secure even after
alliances were forged with the rural, landed Muslim elites of the
Muslim-majority areas, on the road to partition and the formation of Pakistan.1 38 Following partition, many among the Urduspeaking Muslims of north-central India chose to migrate, constituting about twenty percent of the eight million that migrated to

Pakistan.
Control of the leadership of the Muslim League quickly translated into political leadership of the new state. 1 39 Muhajirs, who

constituted only five percent of the population of the new country,14 ° settled mainly in the major port city of Karachi,"' de137 BURKE & QURAISHI, supra note 95, at 133 (text of the founding resolution of
All-India Muslim League in 1906).
138 Some report that "[T]here was a feeling of uneasiness, sometimes bordering
on resentment, among the leaders of the Muslim majority Provinces that the Muslim
League was dominated by leaders from the Muslim minority provinces." SAYEED,
supra note 127, at 206.
139 From 1947 to 1958, the muhajirs supplied more than half (eighteen) of the
total (twenty-seven) holders of the offices of governor-general, president, prime
minister, governor and chief minister. Theodore P. Wright, Jr., Indian Muslim Refugees in the Politics of Pakistan, 7 J. OF COMMONWEALTH & COMP. POL. 189, 195-96
(1974). By extraordinary arrangements, the muhajirs were given seats in the Constituent Assembly and provincial legislatures, and for new elections designated seats
were reserved for them. See M. AHMAD, LEGISLATURES IN PAKISTAN 9, 14, 19
(1960); KEITH CALLARD, PAKISTAN: A POLITICAL STUDY 79 (1957).
140 At partition, the ethnic distribution of the population of Pakistan was : Bengalis 52 percent; Punjabis 28 percent, Pathans 7 percent, Sindhis 6 percent, Muhajirs
5 percent and Baloch 2 percent. Charles H. Kennedy, Managing Ethnic Conflict:
The Case of Pakistan, in THE TERRITORIAL MANAGEMENT OF ETHNIC CONFLICT
123, 125-6 (John Coakley ed., 1993).
141 In South Asia, Muslims have tended to be more urban than Hindus where the
former are in a minority and the reverse where, as in the provinces which became
Pakistan, they were in a majority. Therefore, it was not surprising that most postpartition migrants settled disproportionately in urban areas of Pakistan. The result
was a divided society where the indigenous population of Pakistan was mostly rural
and the migrants were mostly urban. Shahid Javed Burki, Migration, Urbanization
and Politics in Pakistan, in POPULATION, POLITICS AND THE FUTURE OF SOUTHERN
ASIA 147-89 (W. Wriggins & Guyot eds., 1973). As a result of the mass migration
that resulted from partition, the demographic profile of the new state of Pakistan
was quite remarkable. The majority of the migrants settled in towns and cities. In
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clared it the capital of the new state, and proceeded to take
control of the politics, commerce, and culture of the society. The
ascendancy of this group was linked to its pre-migration status.
Higher literacy and prior membership in the colonial "salariat"
guaranteed domination of the postcolonial bureaucratic apparatus. 1 4 2 The experience of modern commerce, coupled with patronage by the new state, assured domination of finance and
industry. 14 3 This group deployed two stratagems to secure and
sustain the disproportionate power and privilege of an ethnic mi-

nority: designing a political order that kept the majority of the
population disenfranchised, and forging a national identity that

privileged the position of the muhajirs.
Pakistan started its political life with a built-in contradiction.
An underdeveloped, multi-ethnic and multi-lingual society had
44
inherited a centralized and "overdeveloped" state apparatus.'
1951, Pakistan's nineteen largest cities had a population of nearly four million, of
which more than forty-six per cent were recent migrants. SHAHID JAVED BURKI,
PAKISTAN UNDER BHUTrO 1971-1977, at 12 tbl. 2.1 (1980). The migrants brought
with them a culture and a set of economic and political institutions that were totally
alien to the areas that constituted the new state. As a result, the new society was
born polarized. On the one side were predominantly indigenous rural peoples with
their own customs, traditions, history, and institutions. On the other side was a recently settled urban population with relatively modern institutions, education, and
skills. S.R.

LEWIS, JR., PAKISTAN: INDUSTRIALIZATION

AND TRADE POLICIES

45

(1970).
142 Forty-four out of 101 Muslim members of the elite British Indian Civil Service
were from provinces that formed India, and 95 of the 101 opted for Pakistan in 1947.
Ralph Braibanti, Public Bureaucracy and Judiciary in Pakistan, in BUREAUCRACY
AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 360, 365 (J. LaPalombara ed., 1963). By 1973,
muhajirs held 33.5 percent of gazetted positions in the civilian bureaucracy, and
nearly half of the senior positions in public enterprises, although they constituted
less than eight percent of the population. Charles H. Kennedy, The Politics of
Ethnicity in Sindh, 31 ASIAN SURVEY 938, 942-3 (1991). For muhajir representation
in private sector enterprises see STANLEY A. KOCHANEK, INTEREST GROUPS AND
DEVELOPMENT: BUSINESS AND POLITICS IN PAKISTAN 93-95, 97 (1983). In the military, in 1968, muhajirs held 11 of the top 48 (23 percent) senior positions. TAHIR
AMIN, ETHNo-NATIONAL MOVEMENTS OF PAKISTAN: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL FACTORS 82 (1988).
143 See GUSTAV F. PAPANEK, PAKISTAN'S DEVELOPMENT: SOCIAL GOALS AND

PRIVATE INCENTIVES (1967); Hanna Papanek, Pakistan's Big Businessmen: Muslim
Separatism, Entrepreneurship, and PartialModernization, 21 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 1 (1972).
144 The concept of the "overdeveloped" postcolonial state was first advanced by
Hamza Alavi:
In carrying out the tasks of the bourgeois revolution in the colony ... the
metropolitan bourgeoisie has to accomplish an additional task that was
specific to the colonial situation. Its task is not merely to replicate the superstructure of the state which it has established in the metropolitan coun-
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This translated into an early struggle between tendencies towards
authoritarian centralism and representative federalism. The
muhajir-dominated bureaucracy joined hands with the Punjabidominated military to subvert the establishment of a representative, federal parliamentary system. 145 Through a series of extraconstitutional usurpations, palace intrigues, and eventually martial law, a centralized authoritarian system of governance was secured. Conveniently, each step in this process was validated by

the muhajir-dominated superior judiciary, which deployed doctrines of state-necessity, revolutionary legality, implied mandate,
and de facto power to achieve this end.1 46 The political order
was styled "guided democracy,' 1 47 with a twin agenda of
49
"developmentalism"' 148 and "nation-building.'
try itself; it must also create a state apparatus through which it can exercise
dominion over all the indigenous social classes in the colony. It might be
said that the "superstructure" in the colony is therefore "overdeveloped"
in relation to the "structure" in the colony, for its basis lies in the metropolitan structure itself, from which it is later separated at the time of
independence.
Hamza Alavi, The State in PostcolonialSocieties: Pakistan and Bangladesh, in IMPERIALISM AND REVOLUTION IN SOUTH ASIA 145, 147 (Kathleen Gough & Hari P.

Sharma eds., 1973).
145 For an overview of the politics of Pakistan, see MOHAMMAD WASEEM, POLITICS AND THE STATE IN PAKISTAN (1989) and OMAR NOMAN, PAKISTAN: A POLIT-

ICAL AND ECONOMIC HISTORY SINCE 1947 (1988). The Cold War environment and

Pakistan's decision to join Western military alliances helped the political ascendancy
of the military. See AYESHA JALAL, THE STATE OF MARTIAL RULE: THE ORIGINS
OF PAKISTAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEFENCE (1990).
146 See ZULFIKAR KHALID MALUKA, THE MYTH OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN PAK-

ISTAN (1995); ALLEN McGRATH, THE DESTRUCr1ON OF PAKISTAN'S DEMOCRACY

(1996); PAULA R. NEWBERG, JUDGING THE STATE: COURTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
POLITICS IN PAKISTAN (1995); Tayyab Mahmud, Praetorianismand Common Law in

Post-ColonialSettings: JudicialResponses to ConstitutionalBreakdowns in Pakistan,
1993 UTAH L. REV. 1225 (1993).

147 This was the designation given to the political system established after the first
martial law in 1958. See HERBERT

FELDMAN, REVOLUTION IN PAKISTAN:

OF THE MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATION

(1967);

A STUDY

ALTAF GAUHAR, AYUB KHAN:

PAKISTAN'S FIRST MILITARY RULER (1996). Ayub Khan, the military ruler who pre-

sided over the institutionalization of guided democracy, won high praise from proponents of the modernizing and nation-building role of the military in postcolonial
societies. For example, Samuel Huntington wrote:
The new institutions created in Pakistan after 1958 were in large part the
result of conscious political planning. More than any other political leader
in a modernizing country after World War II, Ayub Khan came close to
filling the role of a Solon or Lycurgus or 'Great Legislator' on the Platonic
or Rousseauian model.
SAMUEL

P.

HUNTINGTON,

POLITICAL

ORDER

IN

CHANGING

SOCIETIES

250-51

(1968).
148 Developmentalism, a strategy of economic development, rests on the proposi-
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In this general context, the muhajir elite proceeded to construct an undifferentiated and unified state-nation, the Pakistani
nation, of which they would be the exemplars. 150 Urdu, the language of the muhafirs, spoken by only six percent of Pakistan's
tion that underdeveloped societies are "autonomous" and causes of "backwardness"
are located in internal conditions of these societies. "Traditional" values, beliefs,
institutions, and behavior patterns are taken to be the causes of "backwardness." It
is assumed that the only way that these "late comers" in the race along the linear
path towards "modernization" can catch up is by learning from those already modernized. Hence, the solution is diffusion of Western values, institutions, capital, and
technology, which will help the "backward" societies out of the "vicious circle" of
poverty and move them towards self-sustained and mature modernized status. See
generally,
OPMENT

CHARLES

P.

KINDLEBERGER, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

(1965);

DEVEL-

POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE (Gustav F. Papanek ed., 1968); MAHBUB

UL HAQ, THE STRATEGY OF ECONOMIC PLANNING: A CASE STUDY OF PAKISTAN

(1963); W.W. RoSTow, THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH: A NON-COMMUNIST
MANIFESTO (1961). For a critique of developmentalism, see Tariq Banuri, Development and the Politics of Knowledge: A Critical Interpretation of the Social Role of
Modernization Theories in the Development of the Third World, in DOMINATING
KNOWLEDGE: DEVELOPMENT, CULTURE AND RESISTANCE

29 (Fr~d6rique Apffel

Marglin & Stephen A. Marglin eds., 1990).
149 "Nation-building" was the companion prescription of "developmentalism,"
prescribed to post-colonial societies following decolonization. "Assimilation," "integration," and "social mobilization" of all the people living within the state were to
be the building blocks of a unified "nation." "Modernization," in the form of increases in urbanization, industrialization, schooling, communication, and transportation facilities, was seen as the primary tool of "integration," and the state was seen
as the primary agency. The state, in this construction, is seen as a neutral and overarching structure of governance which aggregates the interests of all factions, and
formulates, implements and adjudicates rules in the common interest of the society
as a whole. The bureaucratic apparatus of the state is seen as a "neutral," "rational," and "functional" mechanism, which impliments the "unproblematic" goals
of modernization and "nation-building." See, e.g., GABRIEL A. ALMOND & G.
BINGHAM POWELL, JR., COMPARATIVE POLITICS: A

DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH

(1966); DEVELOPING NATIONS: QUEST FOR A MODEL (William A. Beling & George
0. Totten eds., 1970); NATION-BUILDING (Karl W. Deutsch & William J. Foltz eds.,
1963). For a critique of the "nation-building" model on the ground that it ignores
questions of ethnic identity and diversity, see Walker Conner, Nation-Building or
Nation-Destroying?, 24 WORLD POLITICS 319 (1972).
150 It should be noted that the agenda of constructing "state-nations" is a widespread legacy of the colonial encounter. As one commentator puts it:
Very few of the newly emergent Afro-Asian states can be considered as
nation-states in the nineteenth century European sense. They are artificial
legacies of colonial empires: a ramshackle alliance of heterogeneous groups
of people, often linguistically, religiously and racially disparate who were
put together for administrative convenience. These people temporarily
united together in their struggle for emancipation from foreign rule. But
the unity was largely based on xenophobia and therefore superficial. It was
therefore not surprising that unity, forged in the anti-colonial struggle,
withered with the disappearance of the foreigner. The common problem in
Africa and Asia today is that having found a state, the people are now
struggling to forge a nation.

(Vol. 76, 1997]
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population, became the national language. 5 1 Islam, the religion
that had provided the muhajirs protection under the colonial
separate electorate system, became the state religion. 152 Forged
by an arbitrary bonding of Islam and Urdu, an "official nationalism''153 was created to provide the ideological scaffolding for the
politically defined collectivity. This was not a national identity
that had organic or spontaneous origins, but was one imposed by
dominant elites who controlled the state apparatuses to consolidate their hegemony. That the state would create a nation,
rather than the other way around, was considered an unproblematic agenda of the political order.1 54 This "state-nation"
was built upon a "retrospective illusion," through which the state
is constituted as a national community "which recognizes itself in
' 55 "Print-capitalism,' 1' 56
advance in the institution of the state.'
an important part of the construction of nations as imagined
communities according to Benedict Anderson, played a pivotal
role in this "nation-building" exercise. The muhajirs had a free
hand to build the nation in their own image because of their command of Urdu, state ownership of broadcasting, and governmental control of the press. The nation, in this context, became the
Gowher Rizvi, Pakistan: The Domestic Dimensions of Security, in SOUTH ASIAN
INSECURITY AND THE GREAT POWERS 84 (Barry Buzan & Gowher Rizvi eds., 1986).
151 Tariq Rahman, Language and Politics in a PakistaniProvince: The Sindhi Lan-

guage Movement, 35 ASIAN SURV. 1005, 1006 (1995). It was the defense of Urdu as
the national language, articulated by M.A. Jinnah, the first Governor-General of
Pakistan, as early as 1948, that gave rise to a resistance movement in Bengal. See
SAYEED, supra note 127, at 300. Conversely, when Bengali language was accorded
equal status by the Constituent Assembly in 1954, there were riots in Karachi.
Wright, supra note 139, at 199. See also AFTAB A. KAzr, ETHNICITY AND EDUCATION IN NATION-BUILDING: THE CASE OF PAKISTAN (1987).

Voicing his discomfort

with recognizing Bengali as one of two "national" languages, Ayub Khan, the military ruler of Pakistan from 1958-1969, wrote, "It is quite clear to me that with two
national languages we cannot become a one nation state ....
" MOHAMMAD AYUB
KHAN, FRIENDS NOT MASTERS: A POLITICAL AUTOBIOGRAPHY

102 (1967).

152 See Hamza Alavi, Pakistan and Islam: Ethnicity and Ideology, in STATE AND
IDEOLOGY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND PAKISTAN 64 (Fred Halliday & Hamza Alavi
eds., 1988). See also ASAF HUSSAIN, ELITE POLITICS IN AN IDEOLOGICAL STATE

(1979).
153 BENEDICT ANDERSON,

IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORI-

GIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 80-103 (1983).

154 This project was succinctly expressed by Ayub Kahn, the chief of the military
who later became the military ruler between 1958-1969: "The ultimate aim of Pakistan must be to become a sound, solid and cohesive nation .... KHAN, supra note
151, at 54.
155 Etienne Balibar, The Nation Form: History and Ideology, in RACE, NATION,
CLASS: AMBIGUOUS IDENTITIES 86, 93 (Chris Turner trans., 1991).
156 ANDERSON, supra note 153.
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property of a privileged group. Armed with Urdu and Islam,
muhajir identity was projected as that of the "true Pakistani."
"Unity, faith, and discipline," were proclaimed as the "national"
creed,' 5 7 where "unity" translated into a denial of federalism and
"discipline" meant acceptance of authoritarianism under the ideological cover of the Islamic "faith." "Conjuring Pakistan"' 5 s
was also facilitated in no small measure by narratives of historic
origins rooted in heroic sacrifice of migration that were deployed
to bridge "the tensions inherent in Pakistan's geographical and
ideological frontiers."1'59 Like Jaques Vernant's category of "militant refugees,"' 6 the muhajirs did not accept their status as a
political handicap; if there was to be national integration, it had
to be from where they stood at the top of the social status pyramid and not from the bottom. In the process, the muhajirs posited notions of citizenship through strategic deployment of their
comparative privilege.
Denial of federalism became a cardinal principle of the
muhajir-dominated state.' 6 ' The ethnic, cultural, and linguistic
diversity of the country was seen as a threat that might fragment
the territorial integrity of the state and had the potential to destroy the muhajir-dominated social order. The historic division
of northwestern India into distinct provinces was abolished in
favor of a unified administrative structure. Any assertion of regional identity based on distinct language, culture, or history was
construed as a challenge to the integrity of the "unified nation,"
and consequently to the security of the state.1 62 When this created resentment and resistance in East Bengal, 6 3 Baluchistan,' 6
157 See generally Richard Kurin, The Culture of Ethnicity in Pakistan, in SHARI'AT
AND AMBIGUITY IN SOUTH ASIAN ISLAM 220 (Katherine P. Ewing ed., 1988).
158 Ayesha Jalal, Conjuring Pakistan: History as Official Imagining, 27 INT'L J. OF
MIDDLE EAST STUD. 73 (1995).
159 Id. at 76.
160 JACQUES VERNANT, THE REFUGEE IN THE POST-WAR WORLD 17 (1953).

161 See generally Hafeez Malik, Problems of Regionalism in Pakistan, in PAKISTAN IN TRANSITION 60 (W.H. Wriggins ed., 1975); REGIONAL IMBALANCES AND
THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN PAKISTAN (S. Akbar Zaidi ed., 1992).
162 For the use of security concerns as an instrument of political control and sup-

pression of dissent in Pakistan, see Mustapha Kamal Pasha, Security as Hegemony,
21 ALTERNATIVES 283 (1996).
163 S.M. Shamsul Alam, Language as Political Articulation: East Bengal in 1952,
21 J. CONTEMP. ASIA 469 (1991). See also ROUNAQ JAHAN, PAKISTAN: FAILURE IN
NATIONAL INTEGRATION (1972); HASAN ZAHEER, THE SEPARATION OF EAST PAKISTAN: THE RISE AND REALIZATION OF BENGALI MUSLIM NATIONALISM (1994).
164 See SELIG S. HARRISON, IN AFGHANISTAN'S SHADOW: BALUCH NATIONALISM

AND SOVIET TEMPTATIONS 71-91 (1981).
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and the North West Frontier Province,'1 65 it was contained by a
further contraction of political rights and by military means.
This system lasted for some twenty years, but then came tumbling down. The "nation-building" effort to produce an undifferentiated Pakistani "state-nation" failed because resistance by
marginalized ethnic groups, particularly the Bengalis, increased
in intensity, and became impossible to contain or suppress, proving that "[o]ne man's imagined community is another man's
political prison.' 1 66 The "take-off," envisaged in the model of
economic development pursued for over twenty years, failed to
materialize and instead contributed to a widened gulf between
rich and poor and exacerbated ethnic divisions. 1 67 The lack of
civil liberties alienated the intelligensia, professionals and urban
student groups. Pakistan's defeat in the war with India over
Kashmir in 1965 seriously damaged the standing of the military
and led to serious questions about its dominance of political
structures. By 1968, these growing discontents manifested themselves in a mass movement demanding the establishment of democracy, federalism, and economic redistribution. 168 Within a
year, the regime fell, provinces of the Western wing were restored, and direct elections for a new constituent assembly were
held in 1970. Sensing an erosion of the building blocks of their
identity and privileges, the muhajirs readjusted their identity by
aligning closely with right-wing religious parties. They portrayed
demands for provincial autonomy and economic redistribution as
assaults on the "Islamic genius" of the nation and projected
themselves as the custodians of this new Islamic identity. The
result of the 1970 elections, in which the religious parties were
routed, came as a rude shock to the muhajhirs. In the name of
Islam, they supported the military in its refusal to accept the results of the election; this refusal led to a civil war which
culminated in the secession of East Bengal in 1971. Only then
was power finally transferred to popularly elected
representatives.
165 S.M.M. Qureshi, Pakhtunistan: The FrontierDispute Between Afghanistan and
Pakistan, 39 PAC. AFF.99 (1966).
166 Arjun Appadurai, Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy,
in COLONIAL DISCOURSE AND POST-COLONIAL THEORY 324, 328 (Patrick Williams
& Laura Chrisman eds., 1994).
167

See

MAHBUB

(1976).
168 See TARIQ

UL HAQ, THE POVERTY CURTAIN:

CHOICES FOR THE THIRD

WORLD

ALl, PAKISTA': MILITARY RULE OR PEOPLE'S POWER

(1970).
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The new government, responsive to its constituencies, took
measures which were apprehended by the muhajirs as encroachments upon their entrenched interests. The decision to restore
Sindhi as the official language of the province of Sindh, provoked
demonstrations by the muhajirs which escalated into the language riots that claimed fifty-five lives in the fall of 1972.169 The
revision of the regional quota system for recruitment to the federal bureaucracy lowered the muhajir quota from 17 percent to
7.6 percent. 70 Nationalization of large industrial and financial
enterprises lessened the power of the country's largest industrial
and financial houses, which were disproportionately owned and
managed by Karachi-based muhajirs.171 New rules of access to
higher education, particularly those pertaining to professional
schools, expanded opportunities for marginalized groups. These
policies gradually eroded muhajir domination of civil bureaucracy, public enterprises and large-scale private enterprise.
Muhajirs, in response, played a leading role in the agitation
against the civilian government, welcoming the reassumption of
power by the military in the coup of 1977. Restoration of military rule, however, did not translate into a restoration of the
muhajirs' privileges. The changing demographic profile of Karachi and realignments in the military's base of support continued
the relative decline in the muhajir share of jobs, educational opportunities, and political influence. 7 2 All this combined to produce a sense of "relative deprivation,' 1 73 whereby groups
become disaffected from a system when the gap between society's resources and opportunities to which they feel entitled and
their share in those resources increases to an intolerable level.
Muhajirs responded to the continuing decline of their privi'
leges and power by "an overnight ethnic redefinition," 174
169

Kennedy, supra note 142, at 944.

170

See generally

CHARLES

H.

KENNEDY,

BUREAUCRACY

IN PAKISTAN

181-208

(1987). For a good analysis of the quota system, see Charles H. Kennedy, Policies of
RedistributionalPreferences in Pakistan, in ETHNIC PREFERENCES AND PUBLIC POLICY IN DEVELOPING STATES 63 (Nevitte & Kennedy eds., 1986).
171 See KOCHANEK, supra note 142, at 80-83; Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan's
Economy under Zia, in PAKISTAN UNDER THE MILITARY: ELEVEN YEARS OF ZIA
UL HAO 87, 92-96 (Shahid Javed Burki & Craig Baxter eds., 1991).
172 Later, the military regime in 1982 introduced a system whereby ten percent of
federal service jobs were reserved for military personnel and many retired officers
were appointed to positions in public enterprises. KENNEDY, BUREAUCRACY IN
PAKISTAN, supra note 170, at 122-25.
173 TED ROBERT GURR, WHY MEN REBEL

174

59-91 (1970).

Hamza Alavi, Politics of Ethnicity in India and Pakistan, in
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whereby they posited a distinct muhajir identity.17 5 In a complete reversal of their position, maintained since the establishment of the state, they now asserted that Pakistan was in fact a
multi-national society, and that muhajirs constituted a distinct
fifth nationality along with the Punjabis, Pathans, Sindhis, and
Baloch. 17 6 On the basis of this distinct national status, they demanded enhanced opportunities for education, governmental
jobs, and political representation. In a significant symbolic move,
they proceeded to adopt the term muhajir to signify their newfound national status. A signifier they had shunned in earlier
days as detracting from their being part of the unified Pakistani
nation now became a badge of honor. Not surprisingly, the assertion of muhajir identity was led by those who were most adversely affected by the decline in muhajir fortunes: youths
seeking education and employment as part of the salariat. The
first concrete step was the founding of the All-Pakistan Muhajir
Students Organization (APMSO) in 1979, with its main demand
being a revision of quotas for admissions and employment that
would be more favorable to the muhajirs.177 In 1984, the leadership of APMSO turned the organization into a political party
named Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz [Migrant National Front]
(MQM), with its primary demands remaining recognition of their
status as a separate nationality and increased representation in
educational institutions, government jobs, and political decision
making.17 8 The following years saw the rise of conflict and riots
1 79
between muhajirs and other ethnic groups.
"DEVELOPING SOCIETIES": SOUTH ASIA 222, 243 (Hamza Alavi & John Harriss eds.,

1989).
175 S. Akbar Zaidi, Sindhi vs. Muhajir: Contradiction, Conflict, Compromise, in
REGIONAL IMBALANCES AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN PAKISTAN

334, 338-39

(S. Akbar Zaidi ed., 1992).
176 See Feroz Ahmed, Ethnicity and Politics: The Rise of Muhajir Separatism in
Pakistan, 1 J. OF ASIAN & AFR. AFF. 97 (1989).
177 The decision to form APMSO resulted from the failure of its leader, Altaf
Hussain, to gain admission to the graduate pharmacy program due to the operation
of the quota system. Kennedy, The Politics of Ethnicity in Sinah, supra note 142, at
947-48.
178 For a detailed listing of the demands, see Theodore P. Wright, Jr., CenterPeriphery Relations and Ethnic Conflict in Pakistan, 23 COMP. POL. 299, 305 (1991).
179 These riots were triggered by large scale migration to Karachi of refugees of
the war in Afghanistan and economic migrants from other parts of Pakistan. See

Akbar S. Ahmed, The Approach of Anarchy: Immigration Flows Fuel the Spread of
Ethnic Tension, FAR E. ECON. REV., Feb. 19, 1987, at 40-41. See also MIGRATION IN
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Migration, Identity, & the Colonial Encounter

In 1988 and 1990, the MQM contested general elections and
swept them in Karachi and other muhajir-majority urban areas
of Sindh Province. Still being in the minority, the MQM was
forced to enter into "coalitions of convenience' 180 with majority
parties whose bases of support were in rural Sindh and Punjab.
The coalitions proved short-lived because the conflicting and
competing demands of the MQM and the base constituencies of
majority parties could not be reconciled. This propelled some
sections of the MQM to demand constitutional concessions to allow political autonomy for the muhajir nationality. Some even
talked about the desirability of secession and a state of their own.
In this atmosphere, conflicts between muhajirs and other ethnic
groups took a violent turn. Complete breakdown of law and order in Karachi prompted the military to launch counter-insurgency operations in 1992 and again in 1995.181 Events had indeed
come full circle. The military, the one-time ally of the muhajirs,
had now become their adversary.
The story of the muhajirs suggests that boundaries of migrant
identity are not objectively predetermined and that, with changes
in contexts and perceptions of self-interest, radical realignments
do occur. Within a period of fifty years, this group of migrants
went from being a "model minority" enjoying disproportionate
power and privilege to being marginalized and implicitly disenfranchised. The "insiders" had become "outsiders." In the
course of this journey their identity was constituted and deployed
in varied, even contradictory, modes. The phase of power and
privilege was accompanied by an erasure of any distinct ethnic
identity. This erasure was accomplished by positing a unified
state-nation, ironically constituted in the muhajirs' own image.
The phase of marginalization was accompanied by a reassertion
of distinct ethnic identity. To make room for this assertion, the
imagined unified "state-nation" gave way to linguistically and regionally defined nationalities. While the earlier construction
flowed from operations of power, the latter issued from strategies of resistance.

180 Farhat Haq, Rise of the MQM In Pakistan:Politics of Ethnic Mobilization, 35
ASIAN SURV. 990, 998-1000 (1995).
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CONCLUSION

The immigrant is traditionally located in the inter/national imagination through the prism of the laborious moves of statism to
project an image of the world divided along territorially discontinuous and separated sovereign spaces, each supposedly enclosing homogeneous cultures and impervious essences. From this
line of vision, the immigrant is always the outsider, the abnormal,
the other. The historical record of the modern inter/national system, however, suggests a different point of departure focusing on
the interlocking processes of capitalism, colonization, and migration. Examination of migratory patterns of South Asia reveals
that they are intrinsically tied to the region's incorporation into
the global division of labor through the operation of colonialism.
However, the relationship between migration and colonialism is
not mechanical or stable. Of the three migrations examined in
this article, one was the product of colonial design, one of anticolonial resistance, and one of the collapse of colonial rule. Each
of these migrations was accompanied by contingent and unstable
constructions and deployments of identities. Colonialism, like all
power relations, was a contested site, and the migrations and migrant identities it triggered were constituted both by operations
of power and strategies of resistance. Power and resistance similarly intermingle in the construction and deployment of post-migration identities of the immigrant. These identities are not
related so much to the fact of migration as they are to the shifting
alignments of political forces. The relationship of the immigrant
with the state and the nation is contingent and unstable because
the state never just is; it is always in the process of becoming, and
so is the nation.

